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ABSTRACT
U.S. Post-Gulf War Policy Toward Iraq:
A Systemic Assessment
by
Amanda Christine Ringeiberg
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis proposes that US policy is structurally flawed toward Iraq and 
the Middle East in general. This structural flaw in US policy-making is a result of 
ignoring the regional considerations of the Middle East as a subsystem. Current 
US strategy toward Iraq is doomed to fail because of the unique structural 
considerations in the Middle East and the failure of policy-makers to recognize 
them.
The thesis begins with a theoretical examination of the Middle East 
subsystem, based on principles from international systems theory. Several 
patterns of regularity that define the subsystem are then outlined. An 
assessment of US goals and strategies in the region and specifically toward Iraq 
will be discussed in terms of the systemic nature of the region. Finally, the case 
of US sanctions in Iraq will be used as an example of a failed US policy that was 
not in line with the regional considerations of the Middle East.
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INTRODUCTION
US foreign policy toward Iraq has generally not been hailed a success in 
the post-Persian Gulf War era. Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, the US 
has attempted a number of strategies to achieve its policy goals in Iraq.
Primarily, the US has relied on military and economic sanctions as its primary 
weapons against Saddam Hussein. Sanctions have been implemented to 
achieve a number of policy goals with regards to Iraq, which will be described 
more in depth later in this thesis. Some of these goals included ousting Saddam 
Hussein, preventing further Iraqi aggression against its neighbors, and stopping 
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Yet eleven years 
after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein remains firmly in power, United Nations 
(UN) inspectors are forbidden from continuing their inspections of suspected 
WMD facilities in Iraq, and international support for economic sanctions is 
waning. The US, with some help from the United Kingdom, remains the sole 
enforcer of sanctions against Iraq. This decade-old policy has resulted in 
significant wear and tear on US military forces and has incurred high diplomatic 
costs of maintaining support for an increasingly unpopular policy.
US policy toward Iraq since the Gulf War has failed for a number of 
reasons. Part of the blame lies in the fact that sanctions are an imperfect policy 
tool. In short, they have not allowed the US to meet its goals toward Iraq
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Sanctioning Iraq has hurt the general Iraqi population, not Saddam Hussein's 
government. Saddam has been able to turn sanctions into a rallying cry to stir up 
Iraqi citizen hatred against the US. If anything, sanctions have allowed Saddam 
to consolidate his grip on power in Iraq. Sanctions may have slowed Iraq’s 
development of WMD and stymied Iraq’s military growth, but they have not been 
able to eradicate Saddam’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, nor his 
ability to use them against his neighbors. All in all, sanctions have had a very 
limited effect on Iraq.
Although the key policy tool of the US against Iraq—sanctions—has failed 
in the decade since the Gulf War, the blame may not lie in the policy tool itself, 
but rather in the manner in which this particular policy was designed. US policy 
toward Iraq has been structurally flawed at the domestic, regional, and global 
level. Policy toward Iraq has not been examined using the context of the Middle 
East as a whole. This has resulted in an inconsistent foreign policy approach 
toward different countries in the Middle East. Policies have been created 
independent of any other regional concerns. This approach is flawed because 
the Middle East should be treated as an interactive system, defined as one in 
which actions in one country tend to affect the rest of the countries in that 
system. To achieve policy goals in Iraq, the US should look at the Middle East 
as an interactive, regional subsystem, with a set of unique regional 
considerations (described in Chapter 2). These regional considerations will 
affect all policy implementation in the region. Implementing policy strategies in 
Iraq independent of these regional considerations is unproductive and leads to a
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systematic failure of foreign policy. Therefore, even if sanctions were 
theoretically a perfect strategy to achieve US foreign policy goals in Iraq, they are 
doomed to fail because the policy was created without accounting for the Middle 
East as a system.
To show how this structural flaw in US policy-making toward Iraq has led 
to a failure in post-Gulf War policy, this thesis will be presented in five parts. 
Chapter 1 will examine the theoretical basis of systems theory and focus on 
regional subsystems and their characteristics. Chapter 2 will review the regional 
considerations that are unique to the Middle East as a regional subsystem. 
Chapter 3 will assess US policy in the Middle East in terms of US goals in the 
region and their incompatibility with the regional considerations discussed in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 4 will examine the US strategies implemented to meet US 
policy goals in the Middle East, again examined in terms of the regional 
considerations unique to the Middle East. Chapter 5 will conclude by bringing 
the issues together, showing how specific US policy goals and strategy—using 
the case study of sanctions in Iraq—have failed due to the impact the Middle 
East subsystem has on US foreign policy in the region.
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
International Systems Theory 
To adequately discuss the Middle East as a regional subsystem, a 
foundation must be laid in general international systems theory. The term 
“system” describes how units interact with each other. The classic dictionary 
definition of a system is: a set or arrangement of things so related or connected 
as to form a unity or organic whole.^ In the field of international relations, a 
system construct can be used to examine how foreign policies are formulated 
and how states or other units interact or relate to each other.^ In this paper, 
treating the Middle East as a system allows one to show how the structural 
aspects of the regional subsystem affect US foreign policy decisions, even 
though US policy-makers have largely ignored the regional aspects of their 
decisions. According to structural/systems theory, the actions of individual states 
when aggregated produce patterns of behavior that may be fundamentally 
different from the behavior patterns that would exist if the individual actor was 
part of other structures.^ Therefore, if Iraq was part of a presumed subsystem in 
the Middle East, there would be patterns of behavior that apply to Iraq because 
of its location within that particular subsystem.
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One of the most important aspects of systems theory in terms of 
examining US foreign policy in the Middle East is the framework the theory 
provides. Discussing the Middle East as a set of regional considerations (or 
patterns of behavior) provides a framework for analyzing US foreign policy 
decisions. Iraq, being a part of the Middle East subsystem, will behave typically 
in certain ways, and this behavior has a profound effect on the foreign policy 
decisions made by the US and especially on the policy's outcomes. Therefore 
once the patterns are identified, it becomes easier to analyze not only past policy 
decisions, but also to plan the effects of future policy decisions with more 
accuracy to some degree. Work to identify these regional patterns has occurred 
at both the international and regional level.
At the international level, Morton Kaplan defined a system as a set of 
variables (or actors) so unique that regular patterns of behavior can be noted 
both internally (among the variables) and externally (groups of variables 
interacting with other groups).'* Kaplan focused his study of the international 
system on defining a set of “rules” that could be used to describe different 
systems. Kaplan came up with six different models of international systems and 
each model had its own set of “rules.” The following is an example of each of his 
model’s rules of behavior (in the interest of brevity, not all rules are included in 
this summary).
Balance of Power model:
1 ) States act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight.
2) States fight rather than pass up opportunity to increase capabilities.
3) States stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor.
4) States act to oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume
a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system.^
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Example: This model existed in the nineteenth century to pre-World War I 
with England, France, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian empire and the 
United States as key national actors.^
Loose Bipolar Model:
1 ) Blocs (of which there are two) strive to increase their relative 
capabilities.
2) Blocs tend to be willing to run at least some risks to eliminate rival 
blocs.
3) Blocs tend to engage in major war rather than to permit rival blocs to 
attain predominance.
4) Non-bloc actors tend to act to reduce the danger or war between blocs.
5) Universal actors (such as the United Nations) are to reduce the 
incompatibility between the blocs.^
Example: This would describe a system with two blocs (such as the Soviet 
bloc and US bloc during the Cold War), but where other non-bloc 
countries and organizations such as the United Nations still exert influence 
on the two blocs.
Tight Bipolar model:
(Same rules as the loose bipolar model, with rules pertaining to non-bloc 
actors and universal actors deleted)
1 ) Blocs (of which there are two) strive to increase their relative 
capabilities.
2) Blocs tend to be willing to run at least some risks to eliminate rival 
blocs.
3) Blocs tend to engage in major war rather than to permit rival blocs to 
attain predominance.
Example: This may have described the Cold War or parts of the Cold War 
period, if one believes that organizations such as the United Nations were 
powerless and that all national actors were firmly entrenched in one bloc 
or the other.
Universal International System model:
1 ) All national actors will attempt to increase their rewards and access to 
facilities.
2) All national actors will attempt to increase the resources and productive 
base of the international system.
3) All actors will tend to use peaceful methods to obtain their objectives 
and not resort to force.®
Example: There is no historical example, but this system could develop 
out of a loose bipolar system with a universal actor that assumes more 
functions within the system.’®
Hierarchical International Svstem model:
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This model assumes an integration of functions between national actors, 
thus the main rules are that the system will legitimize the structure and 
functions of the hierarchical system. The system will link rewards and 
access to facilities according to the criteria of the system.”  This system 
could be imposed by force upon a bipolar or universal system, leading to a 
directive (authoritarian) hierarchical system. Or this system may evolve 
from a universal system, in which case the system will more likely by non- 
directive.’^
Unit Veto International Svstem model:
Some basic rules of this system are that all national or bloc actors will 
possess the capability to destroy each other; no universal actors will exist; 
and the system will be stable only if all actors are prepared to resist 
threats and to retaliate in case of attack.’® This model corresponds to the 
Hobbesian state of nature, in which all interests are opposed, but each 
actor obeys the golden rule-he will not do to others what he would not 
have them do to him.’*
Kaplan’s international models and rules of conduct can prove to be useful 
in describing, theorizing about, or even predicting a state or group of states’ 
behavior. As one moves from looking at the international system as a whole 
(and trying to discern patterns of behavior), and examines regional behavior 
patterns, it becomes apparent that Kaplan’s framework can be useful at other 
levels of analysis besides the international level. If regional subsystems such as 
the Middle East have some of the same characteristics as international systems 
(i.e., they are composed of states that together form a larger whole), then one 
should be able to come up with patterns of behavior or informal rules of conduct 
for the Middle East. Out of Kaplan’s six models, the balance of power model 
would generally be the most applicable to the Middle East. The other five models 
deal with blocs, a hierarchical system, or a situation in which all states have the 
power to destroy each other. While all of these elements are present to some 
degree in the Middle East, the balance of power model is the best fit for this
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region. More importantly, one must Identify the specific “rules” that govern the 
Middle East rather than try to apply Kaplan’s international models to a regional 
subsystem. These specific regional patterns will be examined in Chapter 2.
Regional Subsystem Theory 
A regional subsystem, as the words imply, can be defined as a system of 
states that is less significant in scale than the global systems such as those 
defined by Kaplan. These regional subsystems by definition will also have less 
“power” than the international systems such as the US-USSR bipolar system 
during the Cold War. Following criteria developed by Michael Brecher for 
identifying boundaries between regional clusters of states, Michael Haas 
identified subsystems in terms of three elements:
1 ) Scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region.
2) There are at least two actors.
3) There is a relatively self-contained network of political interactions 
between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment, 
adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power 
relations and military interactions.’®
The word integration conjures up an entire body of literature based on integration
theories regarding regional subsystems. This thesis does not assert that the
Middle East is an integrative system, but rather proposes that looking at the
Middle East as a subsystem provides a useful tool for policy analysis.
Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel felt the study of regional international
politics was important for empirical, theoretical, and most significant for this
thesis, for policy reasons. They recognized the study of regional politics as being
important for “accurately understanding the dynamics of the region as part of the
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objective of stabilizing the international system.”’® A policy aimed at stability, 
such as US policy in the Middle East, must begin with local issues and local 
balances of power. “A regional focus encourages the surgical use of the scalpel 
rather than the destructive wielding of the meat cleaver in foreign policy.”’^
Cantori and Speigel defined a regional subsystem as “one state, or of two 
or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is 
sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the 
system.”’® Cantori and Speigel defined the nature of a subordinate system (or a 
subsystem, as it will be called in this paper) based on its cohesion, 
communications, level of power, and the structure of relations.’® A subsystem 
could be further delineated into three subdivisions: the core sector, the peripheral 
sector, and the intrusive sector. In the Middle East, Cantori and Speigel defined 
the core sector as comprised of Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, and the smaller Gulf states, the peripheral sector 
contained Israel, Iran, Turkey (and Afghanistan), and the intrusive sector was 
made up of the US, Russia, Western Europe and China.^
Based on their research, Cantori and Speigel found the Middle East to be 
a “coherent” subsystem, in which relatively low levels of cohesion, 
communications, power, and cooperation were identified as compared to other 
subsystems.^’ Other coherent subsystems were South Asia, East Asia, West 
Africa and Central Africa. The next level of subsystem was classified as 
“cohesive,” and this group included Latin America, North Africa and Southern
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Africa. They classified the Middle Eastern core (excluding Israel, Turkey and 
Iran) as a “cohesive” system, defined as having a high element of one of the 
pattern variables, usually cohesion, but where conflict is still possible. The next 
level up was “consolidative” and this group included Western Europe, Southwest 
Pacific, and Eastern Europe. Finally, the highest level of subsystems was the 
“integrative” subsystems of North America and the Soviet Union.^
They found the level of social cohesion in the Middle East to be very high, 
organizational cohesion, moderate, and economic and political cohesion, low 
overall. Communications (via the mass media and among the elite) were only 
moderate, but power was small and the level of conflict was very great. The core 
did not have the cooperative elements such as those found in the Latin American 
core, for example.^ Bringing the Middle East peripheral states into the equation 
blurred the cohesiveness of the Middle Eastern core even further. Conflict 
between the core and periphery then became the main reason the Middle East 
ranked the lowest on Cantori and Speigel's four levels of subsystem integration.^* 
For this thesis, it will be imperative to treat the Middle East core and 
peripheral sectors as one system when examining the characteristics of the 
region. An analysis of US foreign policy toward Iraq requires the examination of 
the outcomes of US policies as they are applied to Iraq and as they are 
perceived by the entire Middle East subsystem. This subsystem is heavily 
influenced by the ongoing conflict between the core and peripheral sectors, thus 
making it important to analyze both sectors of the Middle East subsystem when 
conducting policy analysis. The Middle East subsystem will be defined for this
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paper as including Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Israel, 
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and 
Qatar.
While Cantori and Speigel emphasized the level of cohesion between 
various world subsystems, and the relation of their core, periphery and intrusive 
sectors, other work in this field has concentrated more on identifying patterns of 
regularity among the states of a subsystem. William R. Thompson defined a 
regional subsystem in terms of these patterns of interaction. His definition was: 
“necessary and sufficient conditions for a regional subsystem include: regularity 
and intensity of interactions so that a change in one part affects other parts; 
general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition of the subsystem as 
distinctive; and provision of at least two, and probably more, actors in the 
subsystem.” ®̂
Thompson conducted an empirical study of the Middle East as a 
subsystem from 1946-1975 and found evidence of an increasingly larger network 
of Arab states that managed to sustain interaction throughout the period of study. 
He found that communication and interaction among the Arab states were 
greater than the amount of their interaction with non-Arab states. Therefore, 
although the structure of Middle East subsystem was found to be fluid, it was 
consistently Arab in its character.*
The Middle East has thus been established as a regional subsystem that 
is made up of Arab (and non-Arab) states that consistently interact with one 
another and where the actions of one state have a good chance of affecting
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another state or states. This cohesiveness will be important in examining US 
policy toward Iraq because of the tendency for US and/or Iraqi actions to have an 
effect on other states because of the Middle East’s inherent nature as a 
subsystem. Therefore, US policy must be evaluated not only based on its effect 
on Iraq, but also based on its effect on the Middle East as a whole, and that 
reciprocal effect on future US policy in the region. Policy designed with regard to 
the Middle East as a subsystem may have a greater chance of success than 
policy designed without factoring in the regional considerations of the Middle 
East.
In addition to examining the cohesiveness of the Middle East subsystem, it 
is also important to conduct a thorough review of the specific attributes of the 
subsystem before evaluating US policy toward a member of the subsystem. As 
mentioned previously, Cantori and Speigel found the Middle East to have 
relatively low levels of cohesion as compared to other subsystems, and 
specifically the Middle East had less political and organizational cohesion than it 
did social and economic.Thompson found the Middle East to be a fluid system, 
consistently Arab in its character, with greater internal communication than 
external communication.
Leonard Binder came up with a set of variables that defined the Middle 
East. He noted first of all the importance of common membership in the Ottoman 
Empire for countries in the Middle East because the Ottomans left similar 
institutions and social networks. He also pointed out the importance of Islamic
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culture, pan-Arabism, common language, and ease of communication as being
important to the identification of the Middle East subsystem.*
Similar to Binder, Tareq Y. Ismael studied the Middle East as a regional
subsystem to identify “consistent patterns of interaction that give a characteristic
structure to the internal and external relations of the area.’’*  Ismael placed more
emphasis on domestic and regional factors than on international influence as a
determinant of Middle East nation’s behaviors. As with Kaplan’s models of
international behavior, Ismael outlined several “rules" that apply to the Middle
East. He listed three critical realities of the Middle East subsystem;
1 ) Domestic politics define the discourse of contemporary Middle Eastern 
foreign policies.
Culture, ideology, politics and economics all play a crucial role in defining
foreign policy goals and state behavior in the Middle East. More importantly,
domestic patterns of variation can be discerned such as a tendency for countries
to integrate, sharing a common language, the pervasive Arab-lslamic culture,
and a history of Western rule. These patterns all serve to shape the foreign
policy goals among the Middle Eastern nations.®®
2) Processes and structural arrangements offerees at the regional level 
are extremely important.
When the nations of the Middle East are focused on an issue, such as the 
Palestinian struggle in the 1970s, the subsystem is able to generate a 
considerable amount of power on the international scene. Ismael pointed to the 
ability of the Arab states to cooperate on oil issues in the 1970s and how they 
subsequently were able to exert considerable influence on the global system.®’
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Conversely, when the system Is unfocused (or states are strongly focused on
individual issues), the power of the regional subsystem declines, and the system
becomes fragmented.®^
3) The Middle East occupies an intermediate position in the global system, 
and as such both receives and exerts influence.®®
The Middle East is a region of strategic importance to most of the major
nations in the global system. Western Europe, the US, Russia, and China all
have considerable systemic influence on the Middle East, yet the region is also
able to generate its own influence on the international players.®* For example,
while the US maintains a significant military, economic, and political presence
throughout much of the Middle East, the Arab-lsraeli conflict continues to affect
domestic political concerns in the US.
Policy Analysis in the Middle East 
To adequately analyze US policies in the Middle East, and specifically 
toward Iraq, some domestic and global constraints on US policy-makers must be 
addressed in addition to the regional considerations of the Middle East 
highlighted in Chapter 2. Some of the domestic considerations facing US policy­
makers are the strong Jewish lobby fighting for the security of Israel at all costs, 
and the politics surrounding oil issues where everyone from environmentalists to 
multi-national corporations has an opinion. On the global scene, the US must 
temper its policy-making based on international support, especially the influence 
of Western Europe and Russia on relations in the Middle East. US policy in the 
Middle East is affected by domestic, regional and global concerns. The domestic
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and global constraints on US policy-makers will be touched upon in Chapter 3 
during the discussion of US goals in the region. However, the primary focus of 
this thesis is on the regional considerations of the Middle East and how they 
affect US policy-making.
A lot of work has previously been accomplished in the field of international 
relations that describe the Middle East as a regional subsystem, with its own set 
of unique characteristics and informal rules of conduct. There has not been a lot 
of work using a systems theory framework to analyze foreign policy 
effectiveness. However, use of the subsystem theoretical construct has been 
useful in describing relations internally among the Middle Eastern countries, and 
showing linkages of the Middle Eastern region to the global system. The system 
construct can also been useful when describing the behavior of a specific state 
within the Middle East subsystem and possibly predicting the future behavior of 
that state. One intention of this thesis is to show that the subsystem construct 
can also be a useful framework in analyzing the success of foreign policy goals 
and strategy as they are interpreted within the subsystem. This thesis plans to 
use the regional subsystem as a theoretical framework for describing and 
analyzing US foreign policy toward Iraq since the Persian Gulf War.
A general characteristic of a regional subsystem (as stated earlier by 
Thompson) is that the actions of one country will affect other countries in that 
system. Also, a subsystem is defined by a set of informal rules or patterns of 
behavior that should be expected to remain relatively consistent across the 
subsystem. This being the case, US foreign policy decisions made toward one
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Middle Eastern country should 1 ) be expected to affect more than just the target 
country, and 2) be hindered or enhanced by the patterns of behavior found in the 
Middle East. Analysis of a particular policy can then be conducted and that 
policy can be shown to be either compatible or incompatible with the systemic 
nature of the Middle East (i.e. compatible/incompatible with the broader regional 
considerations of the policy). However, one key limitation to the use of systems 
theory in this manner is that It assumes that countries in a subsystem are 
homogenous and will behave in the same way. There are great differences 
between many nations in the Middle East, especially politically and economically. 
The Middle East subsystem can be a very fragmented one, and thus does not 
conform nicely to the general regional considerations that will be described in 
Chapter 2. Despite this shortcoming, looking at the Middle East in a systemic 
manner does have some positive applications, especially in the realm of US 
foreign policy-making.
This thesis strives to examine US foreign policy toward Iraq in terms of the 
regional considerations of the Middle East from the perspective of the US policy­
maker. Using a theoretical framework of six particular regional considerations of 
the Middle East subsystem (explained in Chapter 2), US policy goals and 
strategies in the Middle East will be assessed in terms of these regional 
considerations (Chapters 3 and 4). Finally, the structural problems of US policy 
toward Iraq will be explained using the sanctions policy tool as an example 
(Chapter 5).
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CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
Introduction
A regional subsystem such as the Middle East will have general 
characteristics and a set of informal rules or patterns of behavior that define it as 
a subsystem. The Middle East shares some general characteristics with other 
regional subsystems in the world, such as being a group of interacting states with 
ethnic, cultural, social, historical and linguistic bonds/ What happens in one part 
of the subsystem will affect other parts of the subsystem due to the interaction 
between nations of a subsystem.^ But beyond the general characteristics of a 
regional subsystem, the Middle East subsystem has some specific patterns of 
behavior that are unique to it. This Chapter will explore the historical basis for 
these patterns, which will be used to analyze US policy in the Middle East in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
Just as Morton Kaplan came up with a set of rules to govern his 
international models, the Middle East subsystem is based on a set of regional 
considerations. These considerations are useful to understand from a policy­
making standpoint, since they will affect the outcomes of policies enacted in the 
region. This set of regional considerations will also help shape US policy 
positions in the region. When the US creates a policy to reach a certain goal
19
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with Iraq, these regional considerations will affect the nature of Iraq’s response to 
the policy as well as the regional responses.
Six regional considerations will be considered in this chapter. First, the 
Middle East nations are traditionally non-democratic in nature, leading to very 
limited foreign policy inputs from the population in the decision-making process. 
Second, pan-Arab and pan-lslamic themes are prevalent in many of the policies 
and decisions made by leaders in the Middle East. Third, there is a culture of 
anti-imperialism and anti-Westemism among the population in the Middle East. 
Fourth, the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio has polarized the region, along with the larger 
global system, and has forced nations to take sides in this highly volatile conflict. 
Fifth, the Middle East has been economically under-developed compared to the 
West, largely because the government elites are unwilling to change the 
economic structure and due to the Gulf nations’ reliance on oil exports. Sixth, the 
Middle East subsystem is largely a fragmented system, which weakens the 
subsystem as a whole.
No single list of considerations for the Middle East could ever cover all the 
possible patterns of behavior for the region. However, the six considerations 
listed above are designed to cover the substantive areas of economics, culture, 
religion, politics, and social issues that bond nations of a region together into a 
subsystem. They also cover the most salient issues that characterize the Middle 
East and are the most pervasive issues in the region. The six considerations 
offered in this thesis build on the patterns in the Middle East previously noted by 
Thompson, Binder and Ismael (discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis).^
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Non-Democratic Governments 
The typical Middle Eastern government is non-democratic, which is to say 
that the governments are not elected by the people, and not held accountable for 
their actions to the people in the form of regular, open elections. Of the 16 
countries considered in this thesis, seven are monarchies (Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia), three are essentially 
autocratic (Iraq, Syria, and Libya), three are republics (Egypt, Yemen, and 
Lebanon), two are parliamentary democracies (Turkey and Israel), and Iran is an 
Islamic republic with elected officials.^ While there is variance among the degree 
of popular input allowed by each of these forms of government, the monarchies 
and autocracies have the least amount of orderly input by their populations into 
the process of government. With the exception of Turkey and Israel, one could 
argue that as many as 14 nations in this region exclude large portions of their 
populations from policy-making. However, there is also a certain degree of 
disorderly participation that happens throughout the Middle East in the form of 
riots and protests. This increased mobilization of the population has been on the 
rise in recent years. As a result of modernization, the lower strata of the 
population has rising expectations and the newer middle classes are demanding 
greater participation in government.^ In general though, this demand for change 
has not caused a significant increase in the amount of participation allowed by 
governments, especially when it involves foreign policy decisions.
This lack of orderly political input from the general population in the Middle 
East means that heads of state have a lot of power to make unilateral decisions
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on behalf of their country. Ultimately, the leader of a country becomes the sole 
foreign policy-making body of that country. Traditionally, foreign policy 
establishments are generally weak and there is virtually no input from the non­
elite segments of the typical Middle Eastern population.^ In some states such as 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the religious clerics attempt to assert considerable 
impact on the government and influence its foreign policies. The Islamic leaders 
espouse policies that are more often anti-West and against the rapid pace of 
modernization than the secular leaders.^ This is not to imply that there are no 
other inputs from within or outside the government in making foreign policy 
decisions, just that the Middle Eastern leaders typically have far more latitude in 
decision-making than those in the Western-style democracies.® It is also 
important to note that the type of decision being made affects the source of the 
policy-making. In matters of “high” politics such as national security, the Middle 
Eastern leader has more power to make decisions unilaterally than in domestic 
concerns. This is even true in Israel, a democracy, where the prime minister is 
granted more freedom to act independently when military action is called for.® 
Another example of a leader not consulting the population or even his own 
government with matters of foreign policy was Anwar Sadat’s decision to make 
peace with Israel in 1978. Many of his top officials reported that Sadat 
circumvented the foreign policy process and acted independently to reach a 
peace agreement with Israel at Camp David.“  Sadat reportedly “surprised ” his 
security council and foreign minister with a verbal notice of his intentions just 24 
hours prior to his departure to Camp David."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
The perils of massing so much decision-making power in one person, or a 
small elite group of people, are many. Foreign policy decisions are subject to the 
whims and fancy of the leader in power, and once that leadership has changed 
(whether through peaceful transition or not), the nation could take a completely 
different course. This is not only unsettling for the nation’s citizens, but also for 
the outside countries trying to carve out diplomatic agreements with the nation in 
flux. Another peril is that foreign policy decisions are sometimes made to 
legitimize governments or leaders in the Middle East, without any sound basis to 
the decisions.^ For example, Saddam Hussein made an almost unilateral 
decision to engage his country in a war with Iran based on reasons that many 
would say were personally motivated and unsound.
The Ba th Party in Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein form a compelling 
example of a Middle Eastern nation where the government acts independently of 
its people and where foreign policy decisions are essentially at the discretion of 
the head of state. The Iraqi nation is a plural one, made up of five nationalities, 
six religions and four languages. “  As a result, successful leaders have had to 
dominate the diverse groups through centralized control of the government. The 
Ba’th Party established firm control over the nation in 1968 (after a failed attempt 
to do so in 1963), and set up a party apparatus with a cellular composition, 
designed to promote loyalty and limit participation at the highest levels of the 
government. Once Saddam Hussein assumed full control of the party in 1979, 
he surrounded himself with a “clique” of loyal followers, mostly men from his 
hometown of Tikrit.’^
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In 1980 when Iraq (i.e. Saddam) decided to attack Iran, the decision was 
not made in response to actual provocations on the Iranian side. Although a 
complicated issue, part of the reason Saddam decided to go to war with Iran was 
that he felt his regime was being threatened by the rise of the radical Ayatollah 
Khomeini.^® Saddam saw an opportunity to safeguard his regime and settle some 
long-standing disputes in the Shatt al-Arab waterway through a war with Iran. 
After the Iran-lraq war, Saddam thought he was invincible as an Arab leader and 
again took a foreign policy gamble by invading Kuwait in 1990.̂ ® Once again, the 
decision made by Saddam was unilateral, with little to no input from even his elite 
top advisers.
The Iraqi case is a good example of the non-democratic nature of the 
Middle East, especially with regards to foreign policy-making. This regional 
consideration is important to keep in mind when examining the effects of US 
foreign policy in the region. Understanding the political leadership of the country 
in question is crucial in the Middle East because that leader is probably the sole 
proprietor of any future policy reactions from that nation.
Pan-Arabism and Pan-lslamic Ideals
The second regional consideration is the notion of a pan-Arab and/or a 
pan-lslamic ideal that is aspired to by many government leaders, religious clerics, 
and intellectuals in the Middle East. The notion that “we are all Arabs” or "we are 
all Muslims” began to take hold in earnest as the decline in Western colonialism
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was occurring. In fact, the rise in Arab nationalism was an important factor in the 
decline of Western influence in the Middle East following World War 11.̂ ^
The idea that cooperation between Arab states was necessary for 
progress became an increasingly popular objective of foreign policy in the Middle 
East after World War II, especially after the creation of the common Arab enemy- 
-Israel. Pan-Arabists strove to unify the Arab nations of the Middle East and 
achieve strength through common foreign policy decisions. Two founding 
movements took hold during the 1950s with President Nasser of Egypt’s call for 
Arab unity and the Ba’th movement in Iraq and Syria. Nasser called for military 
prowess and physical struggle to achieve the goals of a modern Arab world, and 
he believed the Arabs needed a strong leader to rally behind.’® After his death in 
1970, an Arab leader with Nasser’s charisma and vision was not to be found, and 
the call for Arab unity shifted to an emphasis on nationalism. However, one 
lingering pan-Arab institution was the Arab League, which continues to promote 
cooperation among the Arab nations and stands in opposition to the state of 
Israel.’®
Iraq and the Ba’th Party also stand out as prominent examples of the push 
to achieve pan-Arab ideals. The Ba’thist ideology has influenced groups from 
Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as smaller groups from Sudan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya.“  The pan-Arab movement such as 
the doctrine subscribed to by the Ba’th Party was able to bring non-Muslims into 
the call for unity, and in the case of Iraq, even the definition of an “Arab” was 
loosened up to be able to include more nationalities into the movement.^’ Ba’thist
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ideology centered around Arab unity, with the theoretical goal of breaking down 
national borders among Arab states and creating one unified Arab nation. In 
practice however, the larger pan-Arab goal quickly broke down after a split in the 
Ba’th Party between Syrian and Iraqi officials. Now both claim to be the true 
heirs to the Ba’thist ideology.
In Iraq the Ba’th Party now has three socio-political and economic goals: 
Arab unity (tempered by the reality that national borders are here to stay), 
freedom from external dominance, and socialism (economic development of 
public projects).^ There was also a cultural campaign in the 1970s to 
reinvigorate Arab nationalism based on history—going all the way back to pre- 
Islamic Mesopotamia to stir up patriotic feelings about the country’s roots.“  
Saddam Hussein sees himself today as the torchbearer for Arab nationalism, 
both as the leader of Iraq’s Ba’th Party and as a self-appointed successor to 
Egypt’s President Nasser, who had called for Arab unity in the 1950s and 60s.^^ 
Hussein even tried to politically “spin” the invasion of Kuwait as being motivated 
by a pan-Arab goal of liberating Jerusalem from the Jewish population in Israel. 
Saddam then used a withdrawal from Kuwait as leverage to bargain 
(unsuccessfully) for the withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem.^® During the Persian 
Gulf War he also tried to drum up Arab support for his cause by showcasing 
Western “atrocities” on worldwide TV broadcasts and portraying his struggle as 
the West vs. the Arab world.“
After World War II, there was also a concurrent rise in pan-lslamic 
movements. This movement was led early on from outside the Middle East by
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Pakistan which sponsored a number of conferences to promote cooperation 
between the Muslim s tates.A number of Islamic organizations were also 
founded, the most influential of these being the Islamic Conference Organization 
which was started in 1969.“  The concept of Islamic unity or an Islamic nation 
has had major political impact in the Middle East. Prime examples of this have 
been the Islamic revolution in Iran and the role of the Wahhabis in Saudi 
Arabia.^ Unlike the call for Arab unity, which has waned in the latter part of the 
20*̂  century, pan-lslamism and Islamic fundamentalism have been on the rise. 
Much of this resurgence has been due to the lower and middle classes 
(especially the disenfranchised youth) in the Middle East who are increasingly 
disaffected and have embraced Islam as the religion of the oppressed.®®
The pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements have become part of the 
cultural fabric of the Middle East, especially in the last 50 years or so. These 
movements transcend national boundaries and provide a common bond for 
people to relate as “Arabs” or “Muslims.” As a result of this cultural phenomenon, 
outside nations have had a difficult time penetrating the region with any broad 
success. This is especially true for Western nations that are home to small Arab 
populations and espouse primarily Judeo-Christian values. The pan-Arab and 
pan-lslamic culture of the Middle East presents a formidable challenge to the US, 
largely because it drives Middle Eastern countries to make foreign policy 
decisions that may not fall in line with US policy goals. Therefore it is reasonable 
to assume that if the US pursues a policy that is difficult for Middle Eastern 
leaders to accept, they may pursue pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals and hence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
the US policy is more likely to fail. The persistence of pan-Arab or pan-lslamic 
movements in the Middle East means that this will remain an important regional 
consideration for US policy-making for some time to come.
Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Westemism 
Closely linked with the pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements is the 
presence of anti-imperialist/anti-Westem attitudes found in the Middle East.
These attitudes are a direct result of a shared history of Western colonialism and 
interference in this region. The nationalist struggles to gain independence from 
the Western powers in the first part of the 20“’ century were precursors to the 
pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements that surfaced toward the end of the 
century. The strong desire to be free from Western influence is an important 
consideration in the Middle East, and one that creates unique policy concerns for 
the US in particular.
The prevalence of anti-imperialist and anti-Western attitudes in the Middle 
East has its origins in the demise of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1800s, the 
Ottoman Empire began to lose economic and political ground to its European 
rivals.®’ As the Ottoman Empire was steadily weakened, the door opened for 
Europeans in pursuit of raw materials and open markets in the Middle East. By 
the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become essentially a semi­
colony of Europe, providing an agrarian reserve for the expanding capitalist 
economies.®^ Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, 
Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the US colonized the Middle East for
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several decades. A central component of the rivalry among the Western nations 
was control of the vast oil reserves in the region.
After World War II, oil remained the primary natural resource of interest 
among the Western powers, but the US emerged from the conflict with newfound 
power and influence in the region. The US now dominated the economies of its 
capitalist rivals as well as those of the Middle East nations.®® Ex-British mandates 
from Palestine to Iran fell under the US sphere of influence and a series of pro- 
US neocolonial states were set up throughout the Middle East. Rivalries in the 
region between the US and the USSR during the Cold War forced the US to 
pursue the establishment of a series of pro-US governments. The US strove to 
maintain dominance in the region by committing large transfers of weapons to 
the nations under its influence.®^
This history of imperialism and dominance by the Western powers (and to 
a lesser extent Soviet imperialism) has affected and continues to affect foreign 
policy in the Middle East. Obviously, there is an element of mistrust in relations 
between the West and the Middle East stemming from decades of economic and 
political exploitation. Also, anti-imperialism has led to policies of “positive 
neutralism” by many nations in the Middle East. Positive neutralism is a policy of 
non-alignment with the major powers and a commitment to aid the less 
developed countries in the Middle East.®® This policy of non-alignment was 
started by President Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s, and was continued by nations 
such as Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, Algeria and Sudan in the 1960s.®® The Ba’th 
Party in Iraq still officially subscribes today to positive neutralism in its foreign
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policy, with an obvious anti-Western flavor. The second of the Ba’th Party’s three 
social goals, freedom, (unity and socialism are the other two) has been 
interpreted to mean that Iraqi citizens should be free from external dominance 
and reduce dependence on other states.®  ̂Positive neutralism can have a 
significant impact on Western nations trying to influence foreign policy outcomes 
in the Middle East. However, since the Persian Gulf War, the doctrine of positive 
neutralism has been on the decline in the region. Nations have been more 
concerned with improving their own economic situation, and less interested in 
achieving pan-Arab goals.
Another factor leading to the anti-imperialist/anti-Western attitudes that are 
prevalent in the Middle East has been the perceived inconsistency and self­
interestedness of foreign policy decisions by the Western powers, especially the 
US. One example of this inconsistency was during the Iran-lraq War. The US 
had previously not supported the Ba’th regime in Iraq, but when Iraq began 
fighting the Revolutionary government in Iran, the US decided to provide 
intelligence information to Iraq in order to prevent Iran from achieving a victory 
over Iraq.®®
An example of self-interested (and unpopular) policy-making by the US 
occurred in Iran. In 1953 the US supported a coup to overthrow the National 
Front Party leader Mossadeq because he wanted to reduce foreign influence in 
Iran and nationalize the oil fields.®® The US supported this coup despite the fact 
that Mossadeq was anti-Communist. In 1979, in the middle of the Cold War, the 
US then opposed the Iranian Revolution (although the revolutionaries were anti-
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Marxist and anti-Soviet) based largely on the fact that the US would lose control 
of the Shah’s pro-US regime and Iran’s oil.“  In both cases the US acted in its 
own best economic and political interest, yet attempted to couch its decision in 
terms of what was best for the Iranian people. Many in the Middle East could 
readily see the contradiction of supporting a brutally repressive regime under the 
Shah for purely self-interested motives such as access to oil in Iran.
Inconsistent policies have caused many in the Middle East to believe the 
US makes foreign policy decisions based on purely selfish economic or political 
reasons, at the expense of what may be the best decision for Middle Eastern 
nations. This deepens the mistrust of Western powers and especially the US, 
making it very difficult for the US to influence events in the region, especially at 
the popular level. This legacy of anti-Western attitudes in the Middle East 
significantly impacts policy-making in the region. Understanding this 
consideration about the Middle East, and attempting to minimize the concerns it 
brings up, will help to ensure the US makes successful policy decisions toward 
the Middle East.
Economic Structure 
Another regional consideration that influences policy outcomes in the 
Middle East is the relationship between the Arab elite and the West, and the 
economic structure brought about by this relationship. Just as the prevalent anti­
imperialist/anti-Western attitude took its roots from the colonial past of the Middle 
East, the contemporary economic patterns in the Middle East also have ties to
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the colonization of the region by the Western powers. There are prevailing 
economic patterns that still define the region today. One pattern is that small 
groups of Arab elite almost single-handedly control the national economies. 
Another characteristic is the region is significantly less developed as compared to 
the West. Also, there is a division of “have” and “have-not” countries within the 
Middle East, broken out along oil producing and non-oil producing lines. All of 
these patterns have substantial impact on foreign policy in the region. US policy­
makers need to understand these patterns in order to better predict the outcome 
of their policy decisions in the Middle East.
The colonization of the Middle East by the Western powers set up a 
“transnational system of privilege” in which the privileged few joined forces 
across national borders and set up a system defined by inequity, dependence, 
and exploitation.'" The dominant (in this case Western) countries controlled the 
subordinate countries by establishing a cozy relationship with the domestic elites. 
The domestic elites remain detached from the broader population in their 
country, and they continue to strive to maintain this arrangement because it 
personally benefits their own group of elite citizens."*® In the Middle East, this 
ruling elite was initially made up of sherifs (those who claim to be descendants of 
Muhammad), traditional tribal sheikhs, religious leaders and the subsidiary 
groups of merchants after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Although many would 
later quarrel with the Western powers, in the beginning all were willing servants 
of the British and the French, at the expense of the ruled classes.*®
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The West continues to support these elite ruling cliques even today 
because of the great economic benefit derived from the arrangement such as 
access to oil and military arms sales. The West overlooks the legitimacy of these 
ruling groups and continues to support them as long as the ruling elite is pro- 
West.** The US will work with the legitimate, modernizing elite—the Arab leaders 
who buck the traditional, religious political structure—if those leaders are pro-US. 
If not, the US will establish a relationship with the illegitimate governments 
anyway. This relationship between the West and the Arab elite has kept the 
West in control of relatively cheap oil prices and has maintained the ability to act 
almost unilaterally in this region since the 1970s. This feeds into Johan 
Galtung’s theory of imperialism and the relationship of the core and the periphery 
states. Galtung believed the privileged few would join forces across borders, 
thus leading to a structure that allowed economic, political and social imperialism 
to exist.*® The West and its relationship with the Arab elite may be to blame for 
the continued underdevelopment of the Middle East as compared to the West.
The West accepts a centralization of power under dictatorial regimes in 
the Middle East, as long as those regimes use their power in predictable ways 
that serve Western economic interests.*® The initial scramble for Arab oil in the 
first part of the 20*“ century created Middle Eastern kingdoms that did not 
question the West’s plans to exploit the oil. In the early 21®* century, not much 
has changed from this general pattern as the small oil-rich nations continue to 
strengthen their governments created by the West, oftentimes at the expense of 
the ruled in those countries.*^
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Iraq is a good example of a dictatorial regime controlling the wealth of an 
entire nation. Even though Iraq’s government is clearly anti-Western, Iraq still 
demonstrates the standard pattern of a privileged few dominating a country’s 
economy in the Middle East, whether pro- or anti-West. Iraq’s economy supports 
a clique of Sunni Army officers, most of whom hail from Saddam’s hometown of 
Tikrit. It is believed that more than 15% of the national budget for the past 20 
years has been spent sustaining this elite group of Army officers.*®
In addition to a well-established pattern of small ruling groups dominating 
national economies in the Middle East, there is also a historical pattern of under­
development with the West. This is partially due to the type of political regimes 
found in the Middle East. There is centralized control of the national economies, 
and Arab leaders realize that economic progress brings with it threats to political 
stability. The developmental process can produce social dislocation and strain 
due to urbanization, can breed alienation among large segments of the 
population, and creates pressure for more political participation.*® Also, the 
Middle East may remain underdeveloped as compared to the Western countries 
due to the historical pattern of external intrusions into their region. For example, 
the Western dominance of Middle Eastern oil fields until the early 1970s could 
also have contributed to the region’s slower economic progress.®® Today, multi­
national corporations wield substantial influence in the region, and many would 
accuse them of perpetuating Western economic domination of the Middle East.
Capitalist development of the Middle East has also exacerbated the 
pattern of a small group of Arab rulers controlling the economies of a particular
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country. There remains a firmly entrenched set of elites in the region unwilling to 
change its behavior. Because the region was underdeveloped to begin with, 
capitalist development has required that governments and businesses rely on 
foreign investment to expand their production sector of raw materials. This has 
placed these underdeveloped countries a permanent “step behind" since they get 
bogged down in a cycle of debt and in a subordinate position as compared to the 
highly industrialized capitalist nations.®’ The Middle Eastern nations who chose a 
path of socialist development rather than capitalism such as Libya, Iraq, and 
Egypt (under Nasser) have also found progress to be slow due to bureaucratic 
competition and inefficiency.®®
The inequitable distribution of oil and to a lesser extent the different 
approaches to economic development (socialist vs. capitalist) have led to a 
division in the Middle East of “have” and “have-not” nations. Table 1 shows the 
disparity between the countries of the Middle East in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita (in year 2000 US dollars).®® Not only is the division 
between rich and poor nations obvious, but these numbers also show that even 
the richest Middle Eastern nation (the UAE) is nowhere near the economic 
development and purchasing power of the US.
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Table 1
Disparity in Average Incomes in the Middle East
Countrv 2000 GDP oer caoita
UAE $22,800
Qatar $20,300
Israel $18,900
Bahrain $15,900
Kuwait $15,000
Saudi Arabia $10,500
Oman $7,700
Turkey $6,800
Iran $6,300
Lebanon $5,000
Egypt $3,600
Jordan $3,500
Syria $3,100
Iraq $2,500
Yemen $820
United States $36,200
Source: CIA World Factbook 2001
The capital-rich oil nations that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) have become 
increasingly isolated from the rest of the region as a result of their economic 
success and close ties with the West. They are now faced with two choices: a 
more equitable sharing of oil revenues among the Middle Eastern nations, or a 
continued reliance on outside assistance (mainly from the US) to maintain the 
regional status quo.®*
In addition to the disparities between average income in the Middle East, 
there is also maldistribution of income within countries. In Egypt, nearly a third of 
their population (about 19 million people) live below the poverty line, which is
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defined as $30/month.®® So while the average income in Egypt is $3600 a year, 
close to a third of the population actually only makes less than $360 a year. This 
inequitable distribution of income results from a cumbersome bureaucracy, rising 
inflation, poor education and overpopulated urban areas. Egypt is not alone with 
its problems of income distribution. Much of the wealth in the Middle East is 
concentrated in the hands of a few elite leaders and businessmen.
The economic structure of the Middle East can be simplified into a couple 
of patterns of behavior that will affect US foreign policy-makers. One is that there 
are core groups of elites that control Middle Eastern countries both economically 
as well as politically. This is a very significant pattern to identify because in 
general, foreign policy decisions made by the US will be interpreted and acted 
upon by the Arab elite, not by the general populace. Arrangements or decisions 
between the US and a particular Middle Eastern country can be controlled by the 
ruling elite and then they can turn around and mislead their own population about 
the arrangement. This is aided by the use of state-run media in many Middle 
Eastern countries. One example of this is Iraq's ability to take the heat off of 
Saddam Hussein and his clique of officers for the economic disaster that US 
sanctions have caused. While Saddam and his military still enjoy economic 
luxuries, the population is swayed to believe that the US is single-handedly to 
blame for their economic hardships. Iraqi leadership works diligently to ensure 
scarce resources are tunneled to the loyalists of the Takriti tribe, security 
agencies, and the military leadership. At the same time, Saddam completely cut 
off the northern part of the country (Kurdish region) to save resources.®® The rest
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of the population suffers heavily under sanctions (discussed further in Chapter 5) 
however, the state-run media and internal security forces ensure that the 
population is led to believe their troubles come from the Americans, not from 
Saddam’s actions.®^
The other patterns that are important for US policy-makers to keep in mind 
are the division of oil-rich and oil-poor nations in the Middle East, and the 
underdeveloped nature of the Middle East population as a whole. US support for 
oil-rich nations at the expense of the oil-poor nations further divides the region as 
well as solidifies the perception that US foreign policy in the region is solely 
based on economics without any regard for the Middle Eastern people. This 
perception of US foreign policy in the Middle East continues to plague policy­
makers today and is partially to blame for the rise of anti-US terrorist groups.
Arab-lsraeli Imbroglio and Polarization in the Region 
Another key reason for the rise of anti-US terrorist organizations and a 
general anti-Western attitude in the Middle East has been the US role in the 
Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. This longstanding conflict has polarized the region and 
continues to be an important regional consideration for US policy-makers when 
analyzing foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. The emotions surrounding 
this issue are so volatile and resonate with so many people throughout the region 
that one cannot make a foreign policy decision that is not affected by the Arab- 
lsraeli conflict in some way. The issue is so important that US policy-makers
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must be aware of how the US is perceived in this conflict and what effect that has 
on US foreign policy.
The Arab-lsraeli conflict has its origins with World War I, after which the 
British promised both the Arabs and the Jewish population in the region an 
independent homeland in Palestine. British policy in Palestine from the 
beginning was unclear, and conflict was inevitable. When the British were still 
grappling with the contentious Palestinian situation after World War II, they let the 
matter be decided by the fledging United Nations. The UN, through a partitioning 
of Palestine, created the State of Israel in 1948. Israel became a colonial 
foothold in the Middle East for the Western powers, in close proximity to the 
world’s largest source of oil. More significantly, the creation of Israel caused the 
displacement of 750,000 Palestinians, who became exiles from their own land 
and fled into neighboring Arab countries.®® The displacement of Palestinians in 
turn spawned the rise of radical political organizations such as the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and became the single most important rallying 
point for Arab states in the Middle East. Several major wars broke out between 
the Arabs and Israelis—the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, and 
the October War in 1973. The Camp David Accords of 1978-79 were an attempt 
at peace between Egypt and Israel, but they failed to resolve the underlying 
contradictions of the Arab-lsraeli conflict such as a solution to the Palestinian 
problem, and thus failed as a comprehensive peace plan.®® The Palestinian 
"intifada” launched against Israel in December 1987 began an ongoing series of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
low-level yet still deadly clashes between the two sides that continues to this 
day.®®
The Arab-lsraeli imbroglio has been a key factor in shaping the structure 
of the Middle East regional subsystem. Up until the 1970s, the conflict helped to 
focus the pan-Arab movement. Even nations not directly involved in the conflict 
formed a “cooperative core” of states that conducted high-level summits and 
worked together to redistribute wealth and push for Arab unity.®’ For example, 
the League of Arab States and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (GAPEC) were both created around this time. The Arab-lsraeli conflict 
provided structural focus for the Middle East subsystem into the 1970s. Later in 
that same decade however, the regional subsystem began to fragment 
(discussed in the next section) and the scope of the Arab-lsraeli conflict became 
more localized. The balance of power shifted more towards Israel, and Arab 
support for the Palestinian cause began to wane. Despite the decline in regional 
focus, the Arab-lsraeli conflict still remains one of the most enduring patterns in 
the region today.®®
The West’s involvement in this imbroglio, and specifically US involvement, 
has almost single-handedly shaped public opinion of the West by Arabs in the 
Middle East. The US uses its alliances with “friendly” conservative Arab regimes 
to undermine broader Arab efforts against Israel.®® Unabashed support for Israel 
(discussed further in Chapter 3) at the expense of the Palestinians or other Arabs 
has led to a serious perception problem for US policy-makers. The perception of 
the US is that of a “ruthless and arrogant” superpower biased against Islamic
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values. A recent Gallup poll (December 2001/January 2002) found that 53% of 
Muslims polled had an unfavorable opinion of the US, and only 22% had 
favorable opinions (residents of Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were polled). Sixty-one percent felt 
that Arab groups did not cause the September 11 terrorist attacks, leading a 
majority of Muslims in those countries (77%) to condemn US military action 
against Afghanistan as “morally unjustified." Moreover, 15% of those polled 
claimed the September 11*“ attacks on the US were morally justified.®*
This Muslim perception of the US as a world leader with goals opposite 
those of the Middle Eastern nations stems in large part from the Arab-lsraeli 
imbroglio and US support for the Israeli cause over the Palestinian cause. This 
perception is of course an unhelpful one when the US is trying to achieve foreign 
policy goals in other countries in the Middle East. US policy-makers need to 
understand the significance of the Arab-lsraeli pattern in the region and the effect 
it has on many other issues in the Middle East. Oftentimes the special 
relationship between the US and Israel undermines US credibility with the Arabs, 
thus making diplomatic negotiations difficult. As a result, the Arab-lsraeli 
imbroglio remains one of the most important regional considerations for US 
policy-makers in the Middle East.
A Fragmented System 
Just as the Arab-lsraeli dispute divides the Middle East into different 
camps, the region is also fragmented within the Arab and Muslim community by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
conservative and radical regimes. The fragmented nature of the region affects 
foreign policy actions conducted by the US because the conservative and radical 
camps will interpret foreign policy decisions differently. The Middle East 
subsystem is also less capable of exerting power on the global scene because of 
the fragmentation in the region.
This divisiveness in the Middle East had its origins at the beginning of the 
Cold War. The cleavage between the conservative and radical regimes is a 
political, not religious, one that was exacerbated by the division between the 
Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War.® When the Cold War ended in 
the 1990s, the ideological differences of the two Middle Eastern camps lingered 
on. The “conservative” camp is defined by the monarchies, sultanates and 
emirates created in the colonial era. They have a vested interest in promoting 
traditionalism, and promoting Islamic orthodoxy.® Although conservative regimes 
are anti-secular, they maintain close ties with the secular West to aid in their 
economic development and for security purposes. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE fit the mold of a conservative regime.
The “radical” nations are usually secular, run by revolutionary regimes, 
with significant influence by the military. They are also defined as promoting 
socialism and using Islam as a tool of the state. Currently Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
Iran (although it is not secular), and to some extent Egypt are considered radical 
regimes.®  ̂In the post-Cold War era however, Egypt and Yemen are making a 
concerted effort to revise their relations with the West, especially the US. For 
example, Yemen has been extremely cooperative in working with the US in
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searching for terrorists in their country after the September 1 attack. This 
cooperation includes potentially sending US troops to Yemen to train their 
military forces in counter-terrorism tasks, as well as intelligence sharing efforts.® 
Egypt under President Mubarak has also improved relations with the US, to 
include conducting ever-expanding military exercises with US and other regional 
military forces every two years.® Vice President Dick Cheney remarked during a 
recent visit to Egypt: “There is a close friendship between our two countries.
Egypt is a vital strategic partner for the United States... Americans are grateful for 
the assistance our coalition has received from Egypt.” °̂ The remaining countries- 
-Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan-do not neatly fit into the ideological 
division of conservative or radical states, but rather have characteristics of both 
sides.
In the 1950s and 60s, the Middle East was full of ideological fervor from 
pan-Arabism to socialism. The ideological divide fell between pro-Western 
republics and monarchies and the progressive, military regimes. Most inter-Arab 
conflict from 1945-81 was between the two camps, but the ideological divide did 
serve to soften the differences of countries within each camp.̂  ̂By the late 1970s 
and 80s, the Middle East had disintegrated into local subsystems loosely 
connected to one another within a regional subsystem. There was a brief period 
in the 1970s when cohesion among the Arabs was created by the boycott of 
Israel and the oil embargo, but the aggregated power in the region did not last 
long. By the end of the 1970s, the Middle East subsystem had fragmented. The 
loss of focus was caused by the leadership gap left by Nasser’s Egypt.
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Moreover, support for the PLO was waning, local issues began to eclipse 
regional ones, and the economic gap between oil and non-oil producing countries 
widened/^
The effects of the fragmentation of the Middle East subsystem are many. 
First, it weakens the ability of the region to resist external intrusions and has led 
to an increase in the presence of external powers (mainly the US) in the Middle 
East. For example, today there are US military forces stationed in Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and other countries. Second, there is a regional loss of 
power in the ability to influence the policies of other states and regions. The 
division in the Arab world has led to a decline in African support for the Arab 
position in Palestine.^'* Third, regional fragmentation has inadvertently boosted 
Israel’s position because the Western powers have been able to concentrate on 
narrow commercial interests in the region as a result of the divided Arab position 
rather than get involved with the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. And finally, there has 
been a decline in regional dialogue on economic and political issues. For 
example, the Arab League’s “Afro-Arab Dialogue” and the “Euro-Arab Dialogue” 
were frozen in the 1980s.̂ ®
For Iraq specifically, the fragmented Middle East subsystem drove them 
away from the rest of their Gulf neighbors. Even before the Iran-lraq War, Iraq 
felt isolated from the pro-West conservative Gulf oil monarchies and Iran (since 
Iran was a pro-West regime at the time too).̂ ® The Ba th Party goals of socialism, 
pan-Arabism, self-sufficiency from the West, and their support of the Palestinians 
led them in a different foreign policy direction from the rest of the Gulf states. At
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
the same time, the Gulf monarchies were distancing themselves from Iraq and its 
military regime under Saddam Hussein. Saddam drove the ideological divide 
even further by accusing the conservative regimes of being weak in their support 
of the PLO, and he frightened the Gulf states with talk of Iraq becoming the 
"protector” of Arab interests in the Gulf.^
The feud between Iraq and its Persian Gulf neighbors underscores the 
divisive nature of the Middle East over the last few decades. The conservative 
vs. radical regime division fundamentally shapes the region today and must be a 
consideration for US policy-makers. Although fragmented, the Middle East is still 
a subsystem; thus US policies will affect the system as a whole rather than an 
isolated part. Understanding how the conservative camp and the radical camp 
will both interpret policies is equally important for predicting a policy’s success.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, no list of regional 
considerations for the Middle East could ever be all-inclusive. The six discussed 
in this chapter are some of the most pervasive patterns and those that most 
affect US policy-making. However, the region is not homogenous and there are 
significant differences among the countries that make up the subsystem. In 
short, the Middle East regional subsystem is made up of non-democratic 
societies, shares notions of pan-Islam and pan-Arab cultural advancement, is 
decidedly anti-Western and anti-imperialist, is economically disparate both within 
the region and with the West, has an Arab-lsraeli imbroglio that overshadows
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many other issues, and is a fragmented system split between conservative and 
radical regimes. These regional considerations have persisted in the region for 
the last 50 years or more, and it is important that policy-makers examine these 
regional patterns and analyze how they affect policy decisions made in the 
Middle East.
Chapters 3 and 4 will examine US policy goals and strategy in the Middle 
East, and will look at how these six regional considerations have affected past 
policy decisions by the US. Then in Chapter 5 the case study of US sanctions in 
Iraq will show how US policy is doomed to fail when policy-makers disregard the 
broader regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem.
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CHAPTER 3
US GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
An assessment of US goals in the Middle East is now required in order to 
show how the systemic nature of the region has impacted US policy-making.
This thesis asserts that US policy in the Middle East has not been successful 
because US policy-makers do not account for the Middle East as a system when 
setting policy goals and designing strategies to achieve those goals. This 
chapter will examine US goals toward the Middle East in general as well as 
toward Iraq and will show how the regional considerations discussed in Chapter 
2 have affected these goals.
The US has a number of generalized goals in the Middle East as well as 
specific objectives towards particular countries, in this case Iraq. The primary US 
goals in the Middle East have generally been accepted as securing oil supplies 
for US industry and the protection of Israel as a Jewish homeland.‘ A third goal 
of containing “rogue” or radical regimes has also been proffered.^ In the Cold 
War this goal took the form of containing communist or pro-Soviet Union 
governments, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy-makers are 
more concerned with containing anti-US regimes. A less defined goal that 
encompasses the three mentioned above is to preserve stability in the region,
52
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which would in turn secure oil, protect Israel, and contain radical regimes 
simultaneously. Preserving stability will be treated as an underlying objective to 
all US goals in the region, and will therefore not be examined independently of 
the three main goals.
Securing Oil from the Region
Preserving access to oil in the Persian Gulf is central to US global
strategy. Bruce Reidel, special assistant to President Clinton, said in 1998 that:
The Gulf region has been recognized by every American President since 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as an area of absolute vital strategic 
importance for the United States. Not only is it the energy storehouse of 
the world—home to two-thirds of the proven oil reserves of the globe—but 
it is also the nexus where three continents come together...."
Since the end of the Cold War, oil prices have remained stable and prices have
been relatively low. The Middle East produced 27% of the world’s oil in 1986,
and this increased to 35% by 1996.® However, since the oil crises in the 1970s,
the US has encouraged the development of oil fields in other parts of the world.
Most of the Persian Gulfs oil now goes to Asia (Gulf oil is 80% of Japan’s
supply). Meanwhile the US imports oil mainly from Africa and South America
and only 16.1% from the Persian Gulf.®
Despite the relatively low percentage of oil actually imported from the
Middle East to the US, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf to Europe and Asia remains in the scope of American “vital interests.”
Keeping a steady flow of oil from the Persian Gulf ensures that worldwide oil
prices stay relatively low and stable, which is clearly important for the US
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economy. Oil was a primary reason for the US involvement in ousting Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait. While President Bush couched US involvement in terms of 
the preservation of “our very way of life,” he would have been more correct to 
add “our very way of life which depends on oil.”^
There were, of course, other reasons for US involvement in the Persian 
Gulf War. Many in the US were concerned that Israel might preemptively strike 
against Iraqi threats, sending the region into a major Arab-lsraeli war. Many 
were worried about Iraq’s WMD capabilities, including the possibility of 
possessing nuclear weapons. There were domestic pressures on President 
Bush such as a severe recession and high unemployment that might be 
overlooked during a war.® There was also a need for the US to restore the 
population’s hope in its own military after years of “failures” such as the Vietnam 
War, the botched rescue of the Iranian hostages, and the bombing of the Beirut 
embassy.®
Despite the other reasons for waging war against Iraq in 1991, the US
primarily got engaged to protect the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the world. One
high official in President Bush’s administration summed up the objectives like so:
The occupation of Kuwait (by Iraq) isn't, in itself, a threat to American 
interests. The real threat lies in the power Iraq would have in possessing 
20 percent (Iraq + Kuwait) of the world’s resources of oil, controlling 
OPEC, dominating the Middle East, threatening Israel and wanting to 
acquire the atomic bomb.‘°
American forces had been sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990 to protect the world’s
access to oil, since Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq sat on 40% of the planet’s
proven oil reserves." It is highly unlikely President Bush would have risked
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another military failure and put his re-election on the line for a country that was 
not located in one of the most strategically important places to the industrialized 
world.
The goal of protecting the oil supply to the West is affected by several of 
the regional considerations that make up the Middle East subsystem. First, the 
economic structure of the region causes a division between oil producing 
countries and non-oil producing countries. Obviously, the US will need to spend 
more time maintaining close ties with the oil-producing nations, often at the 
expense of the non-oil producers. This feeds into the overall negative perception 
that the US has in the Middle East.‘  ̂These ties with friendly oil-producing 
regimes will be examined later in this chapter.
Historically, a small number of ruling elites in the Middle East make the 
majority of the economic and political decisions for their nations. This situation is 
actually quite beneficial for the US in trying to secure oil flow because the ruling 
elites personally benefit from close ties with the US just as much as the US 
benefits from close, friendly ties with those elite groups. It is a win-win situation 
for both sides, as long as the ruling elites can keep popular input to a minimum in 
foreign policy decisions. Examples of cozy US ties with oil producers are Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti government uses its total control of the economy 
to buy more weapons from the West than it actually needs because it is relying 
on Western help to su rv ive .In  Saudi Arabia, the kingdom pays for Western 
political support by keeping the price of oil low. The West guarantees the
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continuance of the House of Saud in exchange for cheap oil and sales of huge 
quantities of American, British and French military hardware/"
While the economic structure of the region makes the US goal of securing 
oil easier, the fact that the majority of the people in the Middle East tend to be 
predominantly anti-Western/American and anti-imperialist does pose a threat to 
US oil goals. If these sentiments result in regime changes in the conservative 
Arab world, then oil prices could swing out of control and the West will have a 
difficult time stabilizing oil prices without the help of non-Arab and non-Muslim 
OPEC nations. Fortunately for US policy-makers, the fragmented nature of the 
subsystem in the last 20 years or so has allowed the US to maintain a steady 
flow of relatively low-priced oil prices. The conservative regimes follow Saudi 
Arabia's lead on oil pricing, to the benefit of Western interests.But this situation 
is always subject to change with ever-fluctuating political and economic events in 
the Middle East. Shifts in oil prices have historically also been tied to another 
regional consideration—the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. As the subsystem focuses 
more on this issue, the region becomes more cohesive. Middle Eastern 
governments may find it easier to assert their ability to raise oil prices as they 
form a “united front.” Recent escalations in violence between the Palestinians 
and Israelis could potentially lead to trouble down the road for US policy-makers 
trying to maintain a steady flow of cheap oil from the region.
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Protecting Israel
Another major US goal in the Middle East is the protection of Israel. Every 
US president as far back as Harry S. Truman has felt a special commitment to 
Israel that has not been matched by a comparable commitment to any other 
single state in the region or the w orld.Intense domestic pressure on US policy­
makers by the six million Jewish citizens in the electorally vital states of New 
York, California and Florida largely explains the determination of US support to 
Israel.Z ionist organizations have the best-organized and most influential lobby 
in the country and they are almost completely responsive to the suggestions of 
the Israeli government.The US Jewish lobby is described in more detail later in 
this chapter.
The US preference toward Israel is continued through the extensive 
underwriting of Israel's security, including economic assistance, military 
equipment, and public subsidies and tax deductions for private donations to 
Israel.Israel receives generous amounts of US aid every year. Table 2 shows 
the amount of non-military aid that Israel is slated to receive in 2002, as 
compared to the other Middle Eastern nations. These numbers represent US 
foreign aid provided by the Agency for Intemational Development (AID) through 
the US State Department.^ This aid is intended to improve economic growth, 
agriculture, health programs and promote democracy.
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Table 2
2002 Congressional Budget for Aid to the Middle East
Countrv 2002 US Aid PoDulation Aid per capita
Israel $720 million 5.9 million $122.00
Egypt $655 million 69.5 million $9.40
Jordan $150 million 5.1 million $29.41
West Bank/Gaza $75 million 3.1 million $24.19
Lebanon $32 million 3.6 million $8.88
Morocco $10.8 million 30.6 million $0.36
Yemen $5 million 18.0 million $0.27
Source: US Agency for International Development website^’
Most notable is the fact that Israel has the third highest GDP per capita 
(see Table 1 in Chapter 2), yet receives the most US aid in the region. The 
poorest country in the region, Yemen, receives only 7% of the US aid given to 
Israel, and the West Bank/Gaza area receives only 10% of Israel's total non­
military aid from the US. Israel receives foreign aid from other countries, but 
approximately 75-80% of their total foreign aid comes from the US.^  ̂Aid from the 
US to Israel increased significantly after the October 1973 Arab-lsraeli war and 
the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in 1971. The Nixon administration decided 
that the safest course for the US was to enhance Israel's military capabilities so 
the Arab states would be forced to accept a settlement. In 1971, total US aid to 
Israel was increased to five times the prior year's amount, equaling $600.8 
million (of which $545 million was in the form of military assistance).^ The US 
also had been supplying Israel with sophisticated military weaponry since 1967 
(after the Six Day War) such as air defense missiles, tanks, and modern A- 
4/Skyhawk and F-4/Phantom fighter aircraft.^"
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Israel’s dependence on US military and economic aid should give the US 
significant leverage over Israeli policy. However, oftentimes domestic politics 
preclude the US government from restraining Israeli actions that they publicly 
disapprove of, and the Arab states are frustrated by this dichotomy. The special 
US-lsraeli relationship has thus undermined relationships with other allies in the 
region. There is a perceived US bias toward Israel in the Arab world. The fact 
that Israel continues to occupy territory originally populated by the Palestinian 
Arabs (until their eviction in 1948), has led to varying degrees of hostility toward 
Israel by the Arab states in the region. The US refusal to criticize Israel's tight 
closure of the West Bank and Gaza has led to a growing sense that Washington 
has lost its sense of morality and sown the seeds of popular anger among even 
its moderate Arab partners.^ The US has tried to overcome this dilemma by 
supporting several moves toward peace and reconciliation between the Arabs 
and the Israelis. However, Israel still receives diplomatic priority, and Israeli 
support for the peace process usually involves US financial aid.^
Since US policy has also been to maintain Israel's military advantage over 
its Arabs neighbors, it has become exceedingly difficult for the US to defend a 
“neutral” position in the Arab-lsraeli peace process.^^ Some insist that US policy 
is justified by the fact that Israel provides the US with a strategic, democratic ally 
in the region. Others believe the preferential treatment of Israel threatens the 
other US priority in the region: oil supply. The US commitment to Israel is often 
in conflict with the cultivation of friendly Arab regimes to facilitate access to oil.^ 
US support for Israel has brought increased pressure from the Muslim world on
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the conservative Gulf states, which in turn jeopardizes the US presence among 
them.^
To sum up, the US bias toward Israel in the Middle East has been evident 
for at least the last 35 years.“  Israel has received an inordinate amount of US 
aid, both direct and indirect, for decades. Despite the billions of dollars in aid and 
military equipment, Israel is often not willing to comply with US demands. One 
notable exception to this was during the Persian Gulf War when Israel was 
convinced by the US that retaliating against Iraq (for launching SCUD missiles 
into Israel) was not in the best interest of US policy goals in the region. However, 
in the ongoing Arab-lsraeli peace process, Israel has frequently refused to 
comply with US suggestions for peace. Most recently, during the April 2002 
Israeli incursion into the West Bank, Israel ignored several US requests to 
immediately withdraw from the occupied Palestinian towns. The preference of 
US policy-makers toward Israel does not make sense strategically. Israel does 
not have strategic resources that the US depends on, such as oil. The US does 
not have forward operating bases in Israel from which to launch strikes against 
Iraq and wage the war on terrorism. Instead, it is the Arab world in which the US 
does rely on for oil and strategic military bases. However, the US relationship 
with Israel damages its relationships with the rest of the Arab world.
The Arab Middle East is traditionally anti-Western/American and espouses 
pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals. From a systemic perspective, the US protection 
and support of Israel directly confronts these two regional considerations. This 
makes it more difficult for US policy-makers to achieve success in their other two
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primary goals in the region: securing oil and containing radical regimes. The 
Arab-lsraeli imbroglio automatically puts the US at odds with the Arab majority in 
the Middle East because of the US support for Israel. However, because the 
region is currently fragmented, nations are more often concerned about their own 
self interests than greater pan-Arab unity. This mitigates some of the negative 
aspects of US support for Israel. Also, the non-democratic nature of the region 
aids the US in continuing its goal of protecting Israel because the Middle Eastern 
governments can maintain friendly relationships with the US, despite a lack of 
popular support for this friendship.
Containing Radical Regimes 
In addition to the protection of Israel and threatening US access to Middle 
East oil, the US pursues a third goal of “containing” radical or uncooperative 
regimes. This goal originally stemmed from the Cold War as the US was forced 
to recruit non-communist regimes into the pro-West camp. After World War II, 
the US conducted policy in the Middle East loosely based around several 
guidelines: maintain access to the regional resources, preserve stability and 
peace, protect the new Israeli state, prevent Soviet expansion and establish 
cooperative relationships with as many Middle Eastern nations as possible.®' 
These last two “guidelines” resulted in the East vs. West tug-of-war that occurred 
in the Middle East as each side tried to recruit countries into its camp. The 
Truman Doctrine set the ideological blueprint for US involvement in the Middle 
East. The doctrine had two objectives: contain the revolutionary movements in
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the underdeveloped world and maintain order and stability within the traditionally 
class-oriented societies.®^ In 1958 this led to the Baghdad Pact, or formation of 
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). CENTO was a collective security pact 
between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain (the US was not 
mentioned by name in the pact). CENTO became part of the “worldwide warning 
system” of security agreements designed to contain the revolutionary or openly 
pro-communist regimes in the Middle East.®®
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s it was clear that the US must support 
the “moderate” Arab elites instead of the radical nationalists, both to prevent 
Soviet expansion and to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil fields. This meant 
the radical nationalists in the region must be put on the defensive, and any new 
revolutionary challenges must be contained.®" Even after the Cold War ended in 
the early 1990s, the US still considered it an important goal in the region to 
contain the radical regimes that potentially threaten access to oil or preservation 
of the state of Israel. However, the reasons provided to contain these regimes 
have changed: now the US must stop these radical regimes from producing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or acting aggressively against their 
neighbors.
Today there are five “rogue" regimes in the region that have anti-US/anti- 
West ideologies and objectives: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Sudan. The US 
strategy to contain the most notorious of these regimes is encapsulated by the 
“dual containment” policy for both Iraq and Iran. In 1999, the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs defined dual containment as:
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Needed to shift away from our earlier policy of relying on one of these 
regional powers to balance the other, a policy we had followed throughout 
the previous decade with disastrous results. Rather, we would now focus 
our efforts on containing Saddam Hussein’s threats to his neighbors and 
his own people, while at the same time pursuing multilateral efforts to 
prevent Iran from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction 
and the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them.®®
The US open hostility toward these regimes and stated policy goals to
“contain” them, especially Iraq, have antagonized even the closest US allies in
the region.®® For example, after the US missile attack on Iraq in 1996, there were
significant splits in the coalition between the US and conservative or
“cooperative” Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia withheld public support for the attacks,
and there was widespread criticism elsewhere in the Arab world. The criticism
was based on the fact that the strikes were a violation of the territorial integrity of
a sovereign Arab nation. The strikes were also causing further suffering of the
Iraqi people, who were already struggling because of economic sanctions.®^
More recently. President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the “axis of evil”
in his 2002 State of the Union address:
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming 
to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic.^
This statement makes it even more difficult for the conservative regimes to 
publicly proclaim a pro-US stance without simultaneously rejecting their Arab and 
Islamic neighbors in Iraq and Iran.
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US pro-Israeli and anti-radical policies have increasingly alienated one of 
the most important allies of the US in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia. Strikes on 
Iraq, along with increased Israeli attacks on the Palestinians have turned the 
Saudi public against the US to some extent.®® As a result, Saudi leaders have felt 
the need to distance themselves from the US and have recently begun to turn 
down certain US demands (such as launching aircraft from Saudi airbases to 
strike Iraq). A senior Saudi official said; “We are not American lackeys. We have 
good relations... but we are not Guatemala.”"®
Containing the radical regimes in the Middle East has been affected by 
several of the regional considerations that make up the Middle East subsystem. 
First, recruiting the conservative Arab regimes while alienating the other Arab 
regimes directly confronts the serise of pan-Arab and/or pan-lslamic loyalty that 
is pervasive in the Middle East. The US is essentially asking for Arabs to support 
or at least abstain from the US effort to contain radical Arab regimes, which 
includes dropping bombs on Iraq. This is a difficult thing to ask the conservative 
regimes to do, especially when their populations are increasingly voicing anti-US 
opinions. As mentioned in the other sections, the continued fragmentation of the 
Middle East subsystem works in favor of the US because the region is not 
aggressively pursuing pan-Arab or pan-Islamist goals at this time. However, the 
longer the US continues to pursue the radical regimes, especially Iraq and Iran, 
and the more it continues to do so unilaterally, the greater the chance is of the 
traditionally conservative regimes being forced to break with US policy goals.
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Goals Toward Iraq
In addition to the overarching policy goal of containing radical regimes, the 
US has specifically constructed policy goals for Iraq since 1991. In addition to 
simply “containing” Iraq, a more specific objective under this goal for Iraq since 
Desert Storm has been the prevention of further Iraqi aggression against its 
neighbors."' Initially this was the most important goal for US military forces after 
Desert Storm, especially since it seemed that Iraq remained committed to 
regional domination despite its defeat in the Gulf War. Another goal was 
preventing a buildup of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. This goal has been 
slowly elevated to the top of the US' concerns regarding Iraq. Referring to Iraq, 
President Clinton declared in 1998: “...their (WMD) proliferation constitutes an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States.”"^ In the 2002 State of the Union, President Bush 
said:
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. 
The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and 
nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already 
used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the 
bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that 
agreed to intemational inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is 
a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world."®
Finally, a third goal of US policy toward Iraq has been to topple Hussein's
regime. While this goal is not usually openly discussed for fear of backlash
among the Arab allies, the US has focused on Saddam Hussein himself as a
threat to the region.""
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Preventing Iraqi aggression and controlling Iraq’s WMD programs are 
goals that are generally in line with the regional considerations of the Middle East 
subsystem. In general, the Middle Eastern nations do not want to see Iraq attack 
an Arab or Muslim neighbor, nor would they support Iraq’s use of WMD.
However, the US goal of toppling Saddam's regime is definitely affected by the 
systemic nature of the Middle East. Changing the government in Iraq could 
radically alter the subsystem. A post-Saddam Iraq could result in an Arab nation 
more in line with the conservative Gulf states and their goals. A post-Saddam 
Iraq could result in a regime that resumes a threatening posture against Kuwait 
or Iran and reinvigorates old hostilities. A post-Saddam Iraq might be pro-West, 
or anti-West, or neutral. The bottom line is that a change in Iraqi leadership 
would produce significant changes in the Middle East subsystem, especially from 
the viewpoint of US policy-makers.
This uncertainty has led to some degree of anxiety on the part of the 
conservative Middle Eastern states and other countries outside the region. In 
large part this is due to the popular reactions opposing a US attempt to oust the 
leader of an Arab nation. Saudi Arabia is also concerned that a new government 
in Iraq might increase Shiite Muslim influence and further destabilize the region. 
Turkey is suspicious of plans that might increase the military capabilities and 
political strength of the region’s Kurdish population."® Russia and China are very 
sensitive to any US efforts to foster internal unrest in Iraq due to each country’s 
fear of recognizing and legitimizing insurgents."® Overall, many nations are
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fearful of the unknown consequences a new Iraqi regime may bring, and many 
get nervous when the US publicly discusses wanting to oust Saddam Hussein.
Global and Domestic Constraints on US Goals 
There are other constraints on US policy-makers in addition to the regional 
impact on US goals in the Middle East. Constraints occur at both the global and 
domestic levels of analysis. These constraints are worth describing in this thesis 
because of the impact they have on US policy-making. However, international 
and domestic pressures are more likely to be taken into account by policy­
makers than are the regional considerations. US policy-makers will usually be 
well versed on how much support a certain policy has in Washington D C., 
among important lobbying groups, or what the major international players' 
position is on the policy. The policy may be studied to a lesser extent at the 
regional level, especially in the Middle East where the US has enjoyed almost 
hegemonic power since the end of the Cold War.
Globally, it is much harder for the US to operate unilaterally in the post- 
Cold War environment. When the international system was bipolar, the US could 
make policy decisions that affected the Western camp with much less regard to 
the positions of other Western countries than in today’s post-Cold War world. 
After all, the US was one of only two superpowers and shouldered much of the 
burden of defending the Western world on its own. US politicians did not 
consider it as imperative to seek and obtain UN approval before taking action 
against another country such as Vietnam. This is not to say that the US was able
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to act with impunity or did not concern itself with the opinion of the international 
community. However, in today's world the US must compromise with many more 
nations participating in international politics and many of these nations are not 
adverse to publicly diverge from US policies. It must sway the four other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council—Russia, China, France, and 
Britain—as well as a multitude of nations with interests in the Middle East. The 
most recent violence in 2002 between the Israelis and Palestinians underscored 
the fact that many European nations are not afraid to differ publicly with US 
policies in the Middle East (the EU was openly much more critical of Israeli 
actions than the US).
Although traditionally allies with the US, Western European policies in the 
Middle East have diverged from US policies in recent years. France has been a 
vocal opponent of sanctions in Iraq since the mid-1990s. France, Germany and 
the rest of the European Union have called for a possible arms embargo and 
trade sanctions against Israel due to the April 2002 Israeli incursion into the West 
Bank.'*^This is a much tougher stance against Israel’s actions than the US has 
been willing to make. Germany and Japan have also been searching for a 
surrogate oil power in the Gulf to latch onto, thus allowing them to bypass the 
traditionally dominant position US oil companies have in the region.'’® In the post- 
Cold War world, Western Europe (and Japan) will continue to compete with the 
US for access to oil, thus placing a constraint on US policies in the Middle East.
Domestically, the US is constrained by several factors, one of which is the 
strength of the US Jewish lobby. Jewish lobbying groups such as American
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Israel Public Affairs Committee (AlPAC), B’nai B’rith, and the United Jewish 
Appeal have been active in every election campaign, and have a well- 
coordinated national network. Each member of Congress is certain to receive 
regular visits from prominent rabbis and laypersons from his or her district or 
state. Politicians in the highly populous states of California, New York and 
Florida have to focus their attentions on garnering the influential Jewish vote. 
These Jewish groups have great capacity to shape the legislative agenda and to 
promote in both houses resolutions for pro-Israeli positions.'*® The Israeli 
embassy in Washington is also very adept at maintaining close relationships with 
members of Congress, and is considered to be one of the most effective 
diplomatic missions in the US.®*The Arab embassies have not had as much 
success as Israel’s, and pro-Arab lobbying groups are much smaller in terms of 
financial backing and the capacity to influence US policy-makers. Part of this is 
due to the shorter tenure of the pro-Arab organizations, smaller memberships, 
and the inability to reach as many citizens and lawmakers as the larger, well 
established Jewish lobbies.
Another constraint on US policy-making in the Middle East is the influence 
of public opinion (shaped by the media). Instead of analyzing the region and 
acting in terms of actual options and constraints, many politicians base their 
positions on what they think the public or the media would prefer and consider 
reasonable.®* The result is that popular policies can be passed, with little regard 
to the actual consequences in the region. This leads to policy decisions that may
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not be well thought-out and are subject to change as the administrations 
changeover in Washington.
Conclusion
In short, US goals in the Middle East have been threefold. One goal is to 
preserve the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the US, Europe, and Asia. 
The second goal is to protect the security of Israel as a strategic ally of the US. 
The third goal is to contain radical or rogue regimes in the Middle East, which 
have the ability to directly threaten either of the first two goals. Ultimately all 
three of these goals are interconnected in the region. For example, the Persian 
Gulf War was fought to contain and eradicate Iraq’s hostile intentions toward 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The war was also fought to keep an uninterrupted flow 
of oil to Europe, Japan, and the US. And the war was fought to protect Israel 
from Saddam Hussein’s threats and menacing WMD program. Another example 
is the pivotal relationship the US pursues with Saudi Arabia. This policy attempts 
to achieve two goals simultaneously; securing oil from the largest oil exporter in 
the world and containing radical regimes such as Iraq and Iran through the 
support (or at least non-interference) of Saudi Arabia. Recently the Saudi 
government has taken a harder policy stance against any unilateral US hostilities 
toward Arab countries such as Iraq. However, US politicians still recognize the 
important role Saudi Arabia plays in the US ability to achieve its policy goals in 
the Middle East.
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Overall, the US seeks to maintain stability in the region, and has found it 
necessary to use many different strategies in order to accomplish this, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. All of these goals, however, are affected by global 
and domestic constraints as well as the unique regional considerations of the 
Middle East subsystem. Some of these regional patterns are helpful to US 
policy-makers, and some are hindrances to achieving US goals. The more US 
policy-makers understand how these regional characteristics affect US goals, the 
more likely the US will be able to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 4
US STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
In addition to US policy goals in the Middle East, the strategies and 
actions used to achieve those goals are also affected by the regional 
considerations of the Middle East subsystem. In many cases, the systemic 
characteristics of the region have a more profound effect on US policy-making 
during the implementation stage of the policy. Strategies are implemented in 
order to produce an effect that US policy-makers hope will ultimately lead to the 
attainment of policy goals. Understanding the effect that regional considerations 
in the Middle East have on these policy strategies is vital to ensuring policy 
success. This chapter will outline the salient US policy strategies in the Middle 
East over the last 25 years, and will examine how regional considerations have 
affected these strategies.
In pursuit of the US goals toward Iraq and the Middle East in general, 
there have been a number of different strategies employed to reach these policy 
goals. One way the US has attempted to reach its goals is through the 
appeasement of unsavory regimes that are still favorable to US interests in some 
way, such as being the enemy of an enemy (Iraq in the 1980s). Another strategy 
has been to undertake close cooperation with the conservative Arab Gulf states
75
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such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, etc. A third strategy has been 
economic and military sanctions, which are used to force recalcitrant regimes 
such as Iraq to comply with US or international community objectives. Finally, a 
fourth strategy has been to commit US military forces in order to achieve US 
goals, such as the Gulf War and continued patrolling of the no-fly zones over 
Iraq.
Appeasement
One way the US has tried to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East is 
through appeasing regimes that are undesirable with the US in terms of the type 
of government or policies they embrace, but useful in fighting a common enemy. 
For example, US strategy toward Iraq in the 1980s was one of appeasement due 
to Iraq's involvement in a war against America’s newest enemy, Iran. In the 
1970s and early 1980s, US-lraqi relations were very hostile. But after the rise to 
power of an anti-US regime in Iran, the US needed to rethink its relationship with 
Iraq, which ushered in a period of appeasement between the US and Iraq. While 
there are other less significant cases of the US appeasing undesirable or even 
hostile regimes in order to achieve policy objectives, a more detailed look at the 
US appeasement of Iraq in the 1980s is warranted for this thesis.
Traditionally, the US had played the strategic triangle in the Gulf (Iran,
Iraq, and Gulf monarchies) off one another to achieve its policy goals. Between 
1958-1978, Iraq's radical pro-Soviet regime was a nemesis of the West, and the 
fundamental differences between the US and Iraq made a clash seem
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inevitable.* Therefore, the US courted Iran and the Gulf monarchies, primarily 
Saudi Arabia, to keep Iraq’s Ba’thist regime in check. The situation changed 
radically, however, when the Ayatollah Khomeini took over power in Iran.
The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978-79 allowed Iraq to play a more 
prominent position in both the Gulf and the Arab world. First of all, the most 
formidable obstacle to Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf had been removed (the Shah), 
and second, the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini brought Iraq and the Arab Gulf 
states closer together.^ Also, as a result of the peace treaty signed by Israel and 
Egypt in 1978, de facto leadership of the Arab League had passed to Iraq.® 
Meanwhile Iraq continued to harshly criticize US policy in the region such as 
support for Israel, and it had lingering suspicions about US support for the 
Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq."
The fundamental differences between Iraq and the US seemed to be put 
aside by many US policy-makers after the Iranian Revolution during which an 
anti-US government was installed in Iran. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President 
Carter’s national security adviser, said that America and Iraq wanted the same 
thing, “a secure Persian Gulf.” The Wall Street Journal also softened its 
approach to Iraq: “The rhetoric shouldn’t obscure the fact that Iraq, probably 
more than any other Mideast nation except Israel, is embracing Western values 
and technology.”® US commercial interests also encouraged a new approach 
toward Iraq. After Iraq’s oil income zoomed upward in the mid-1970s, American 
business headlines read, “Iraq Starts to Thav/’ and “The Dramatic Turnaround in 
US-lraq Trade.” Brzezinski announced in April 1980, “We see no fundamental
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incompatibility of interests between the US and Iraq,” thus giving Saddam 
Hussein the impression that the US might remain neutral if Iraq attacked Iran,® 
Once Iraq was embroiled in a war against Iran the US began backing up 
its softer rhetoric toward Iraq with actions as well. The US realized that it shared 
a similar goal with Iraq despite their differences-the prevention of an Iranian 
victory over Iraq. As a result, Iraq was removed from the list of terrorism 
supporters in 1982, and full diplomatic relations were restored by 1984.^ Also in 
1984, the US began sharing intelligence information from US satellites and Saudi 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft with Iraq, which made a 
huge difference in Iraq’s ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion.®
When Israel preemptively struck Iraq’s fledgling nuclear reactor at Osiraq in 
1981, the US uncharacteristically condemned Israel’s action as “not in keeping 
with international standards.”® Trade between the US and Iraq increased as well, 
including the sale of Boeing aircraft, dump trucks, and food to Iraq. Iraq became 
the second largest export loan recipient and the seventh largest subsidy 
recipient, receiving about $4 billion in the 1980s.*®
By contrast, Iraq made few concessions to America during this time, and it 
even accused the US of conspiring to prolong the war and weaken Iraq through 
arms sales to Iran. US and Israeli covert arms shipments to Iran in 1985 and 
1986 overshadowed the improvements in US-lraqi relations. Although the US 
was openly discouraging other nations from providing arms to Iran (especially 
after Iran had rejected a UN ceasefire proposal in 1983), this secret US policy 
was obviously seen as a betrayal by Iraq.** Later President Reagan admitted the
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arms sales to Iran were intended to help bring the Iran-lraq war to an end, 
although many analysts believe the US was also very concerned about a total 
Iranian defeat by Iraq.*^
Iraq escalated the war in 1985 by attacking Iranian oil tankers and 
facilities, in the hopes of forcing the US to intercede since the flow of oil from the 
Gulf was being threatened. Iran struck back at Iraq's allies, namely Kuwait, so 
the US sent warships to help protect Kuwaiti oil tankers transiting the Persian 
Gulf. As Iraq had hoped, this show of US strength against Iran was matched by 
diplomatic efforts to end the war.*® Iran increasingly grew convinced that there 
was a US-lraq military alliance developing (especially after a US warship 
accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner), and thus decided to agree to a 
ceasefire in July 1988.*"
The US policy of appeasing Iraq did not end with the conclusion of the 
war. While Iraq issued anti-American statements and repressed its own 
population, US policy-makers avoided confronting Iraq. As Barry Rubin 
eloquently stated, “The merchants of ignorance preached that any criticism of 
Iraq would bring a united Arab world to Baghdad’s defense...why go looking for 
trouble?’*® When Iraq broke its promise not to use the Bell transport helicopters it 
bought from the US for military purposes, the US didn’t criticize Iraq and sold it 
60 more Hughes helicopters. As evidence surfaced of Iraq’s schemes to defraud 
American banks to purchase weapons, the State Department cautioned the 
Justice Department not to be too tough on the perpetrators.*®
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The Reagan and Bush administrations also resisted sanctioning Iraq for 
human rights violations. The CIA provided the US State Department a report 
showing Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988. 
Secretary of State George Schulz publicly confirmed that the US had evidence of 
Iraqi forces using nerve agents and mustard gas against the Kurdish population 
within Iraq. There was a push in the US Congress to impose sanctions on Iraq 
for these human rights violations, but with presidential elections around the 
corner and US-lraqi business interests budding, the White House watered down 
the sanctions proposal. The White House claimed that sanctions would be 
“terribly premature and counterproductive, (endangering) billions of dollars of 
business for US companies."*^
Therefore, even though Saddam Hussein continued to attack the US 
verbally, US policy-makers sent signals of appeasement to Baghdad. Saddam 
believed the US was behaving in a manner that showed it did not want 
confrontation with Iraq. Barry Rubin summarized the impact of US policy as 
such; “Each act of appeasement increased Iraq's boldness without ever 
convincing it the United States wanted friendship.”*®
The US engaged in the concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” 
with Iraq in the 1980s. This policy ended in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
There were some valuable lessons to be learned from this period of US foreign 
policy in the Middle East, as outlined by Bruce Jentleson in his 1994 book.*® One, 
standards of reciprocity need to be set and enforced to prevent an endless chain 
of concessions with a potentially hostile regime. Two, proportionality should be
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maintained to ensure a balance between the support given and the threat faced. 
Third, deterrent credibility must be maintained during appeasement.^
Appeasing the Iraqi regime, for example, or any hostile regime in the 
region is a policy strategy that will be affected by some of the regional 
considerations of the Middle East subsystem. The non-democratic nature of the 
Middle East makes it easier for the US to implement inconsistent policies with the 
touted US goals of democracy, territorial integrity and human rights. Popular 
opinion in the Middle East is often negative towards the US for its appeasement 
of hostile regimes for narrow economic or political purposes. Limited popular 
input in the governments of the Middle East, however, prevents this negative 
opinion from affecting US policy strategies. As long as favorable arrangements 
can be made between the US and the regime in question, popular opinion can 
largely be ignored. However, this consideration does appear to be waning, as 
the amount of popular unrest increases in the Middle East.̂ * It is conceivable that 
in the not-so-distant future, regimes in the Middle East will be more inclined to 
listen to their own public opinion. This situation would make it much more difficult 
for the US to implement policy strategies with hostile regimes (and friendly ones 
too—perhaps even more so) based on narrow self-centered interests.
The fragmented nature of the Middle East also allows the US to create 
inconsistent policy strategies and appease hostile regimes. If the region were 
more cohesive, there might be a better chance that even the cooperative regimes 
would not stand by and let the US implement inconsistent strategies that go 
against regional pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals. The region’s fragmented and
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non-democratic nature helps US policy decisions such as the appeasement of 
Iraq succeed. However, in the end, policy strategies such as appeasing hostile 
regimes do end up feeding into the popular anti-American attitude that is 
prevalent in the Middle East. This in turn may have a negative overall effect on 
all US policy decisions in the region.
Close Ties with Conservative Regimes 
The US strategy of appeasing Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s to achieve its 
policy goals ran concurrent with its strategy of maintaining close ties with the 
conservative Gulf states in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The US has had ties with the Gulf monarchies since before World War II, when 
the US controlled the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Since then the US has attempted 
to strengthen its conservative allies such as Saudi Arabia in the region with 
political, economic and military assistance, while attempting to contain the radical 
regimes.
This has been a mutually beneficial strategy between the Gulf “petro- 
monarchies” and the US. In 1970, the Nixon Doctrine became the strategy for 
beefing up the military capabilities of US allies in the Middle East in order for 
them to shoulder more of the burden of defending their territories from the 
Soviets and the radical Arab states.^ This also provided a convenient way for the 
US to ensure that petro-dollars from the Gulf states were recycled back into the 
US economy. This meant increased arms sales to Saudi Arabia (and the Shah’s
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Iran) in the 1970s, to include selling them advanced aircraft such as AWACS and 
F-15 fighter jets, as well as newer ground equipment.
A close relationship with the conservative Arab states has enabled the US 
to secure oil from the region and to a lesser extent, protect Israel through the 
preservation of stability in the region. These informal alliances have also allowed 
the US the opportunity to contain the radical regimes through the use of the 
conservative states' military bases and political support. However, the 
maintenance of ties with non-democratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia (and Iran 
until the revolution) has caused an inconsistency in US strategy. On the one 
hand, the US espouses the principles of national self-determination, democracy, 
and popular sovereignty. On the other hand, its closest ally is the Saudi 
government that does not embody those principles.^
In the 1990s and early 21®* century it seems to be more difficult for the US 
to maintain solid ties with even its oldest allies in the Middle East (with the 
exception of Israel). US commitment to Israel at all costs and ten years of 
bombing Iraq has forced even the conservative regimes to back away from US 
support. Conservative and radical Arab states alike now oppose the robust US 
military presence in the Gulf.^" Many Arab states, along with France, China, and 
Russia, are now calling for a “shift from an active (search-and-destroy) phase of 
disarmament to long-term monitoring” in Iraq, thus ending any hopes of 
maintaining an international coalition against Iraq.^ In Saudi Arabia, public 
hostility against the US is growing, and officials have begun to distance 
themselves from the US. This growing hostility is a product of increased Israeli
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
attacks on Palestinians throughout the 1990s, and a concurrent growth in the 
anti-US Islamic community throughout the region.^
As with appeasement, close ties with cooperative regimes in the Middle 
East have historically been aided by the fragmented and non-democratic nature 
of the regional subsystem. These considerations allowed the US to enact policy 
strategies while largely ignoring popular opinion in the Middle East. However, 
negative public opinion of US policy is beginning to take its toll on the 
conservative Gulf regimes, who see their own power base potentially threatened 
by remaining “too friendly” with the US. If the region becomes more unified 
(possibly centered around solutions to the Arab-lsraeli violence in the early 
2000s) the US may be forced to change its policy strategies or risk losing some 
conservative allies in the region. An increasingly anti-US Middle Eastern 
population searching for pan-Arab or pan-lslamic solutions to the Arab-lsraeli 
imbroglio will make it more difficult for the US to maintain close ties with the 
conservative Arab states in the future.
Sanctions
The loss of support from conservative Arab states to the US also stems 
from the effects of a third US strategy in the region, economic and military 
sanctions. The sanctions against Iraq that have been in place since 1990 were 
intended to bring Iraq into compliance with United Nations resolutions, but the 
disastrous effect on Iraq's population has incensed many Arab nations.
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Economie and military sanctions against Iraq began in earnest with UN 
Resolution 687, enacted once the US and an international coalition had defeated 
Iraq. Resolution 687 retained the provisions of Resolution 661, which had 
imposed an international economic embargo on Iraq after Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait. The embargo allowed Iraq to import supplies for civilian needs 
upon approval of the UN Sanctions Committee.^^ Resolution 687 demanded four 
things: 1 ) Iraq’s WMD capabilities had to be identified and destroyed, 2) Iraq had 
to agree with Kuwait's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 3) Kuwaiti and other 
nationals held by Iraq were to be repatriated, along with any stolen property, and 
4) a Compensation Committee was established for war claims. Additionally, Iraq 
was subject to a ban on all imports of weapons and weapons technologies until 
the UN Security Council decided otherwise.^ After Iraq's non-compliance with 
Resolution 687, and the expulsion of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq, the UN 
passed Resolution 1284 in 1999. This Resolution called for the reinstatement of 
weapons inspectors to Iraq in exchange for a lifting of the ceiling on the amount 
of oil Iraq is allowed to export for “humanitarian” reasons.^
The plight of the Iraqi population suffering under the strain of economic 
sanctions for the past ten years has caused the loss of Arab and international 
support for this particular US strategy in the region. Some estimates have stated 
that 500,000 Iraqi children have died since 1991 as a result of sanctions, and 
others estimate the lack of food and medicine results in approximately 5,000 
children dying each month.®® Iraq has been deprived of some $140 billion in oil
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revenue, resulting in hyperinflation, contributing to mass poverty, unprecedented 
social and economic dislocation, and an extremely high rate of unemployment.®*
The US placed economic sanctions against Iraq ostensibly to force it to 
comply with UN Resolutions. The first Bush administration then also added that 
sanctions will remain in place until Saddam Hussein is ousted from power.®  ̂
However, the result has been the unintentional punishment of the weakest and 
most vulnerable members of Iraqi society since Saddam Hussein ensures that 
the elite in Iraq receive all the resources they need or want. Saddam has also 
been able to deflect blame for his country’s economic problems back on the US 
as a result of sanctions. This has allowed him to keep a tight grip on power 
domestically, and he has garnered wider Arab support by vilifying the US. United 
States Congressman John Conyers, in a hearing before Congress, stated that 
sanctions are “reducing the possibility of the people (in Iraq) from ever becoming 
organized and increasing their resistance because obviously they are blaming us 
(the US).”®® Thus, sanctioning Iraq has made it exceedingly difficult for the US to 
achieve its goals toward Iraq since the Gulf War, one of which is the ultimate 
removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Sanctions against Iraq will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5.
Saddam’s ability to deflect blame for the hardship sanctions cause his 
people is indicative of the non-democratic nature of the Middle East subsystem. 
Because of limited, orderly popular input and a centrally controlled government, 
the Iraqi people have little choice but to support their government and its 
explanation for why the US is to blame for their hardships. Thus, the non-
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democratic nature of the region makes sanctions a less effective policy strategy 
because of their limited use in changing a government’s behavior.
The struggle for pan-Arab or pan-lslamic unity and the anti-Westernism 
prevalent in the region also can be detrimental to the success of US sanctions in 
the region. Sanctions will ultimately affect the general population of a country, 
contributing further to the already anti-US attitude of the region. And as in the 
case of Iraq, leaders can then attempt to rally Arab or Muslim support for help in 
fighting the imperialist West. Finally, economics will also impact the 
effectiveness of sanctions. Due to the tightly controlled national economies run 
by the Arab elite, sanctions will most likely impact the general population before 
hurting the elite.
War
The final strategy employed by the US in the Middle East and in Iraq 
specifically has been the use of military force. The most obvious example of this 
strategy being used was in Desert Storm when the US used military force to evict 
Iraq from Kuwait. Another example of this is the US and UK enforcement of 
military sanctions in Iraq, or patrolling the no-fly zones. The US has used military 
force against other Middle Eastern countries, but this thesis examines US policy 
toward Iraq in a regional context, thus warranting a closer examination of the 
Persian Gulf War.
The US relied on a strategy of appeasement with Iraq up until Saddam’s 
forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The period preceding the invasion was
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full of signals from Saddam regarding his intentions to attack Kuwait, but the US 
did not appear to be listening. In February 1990, Saddam Hussein asked the 
leaders of Jordan and Egypt to inform the Gulf states that Iraq was not only 
adamant on a complete moratorium on its Iran-lraq War loans, but urgently 
needed an immediate infusion of additional funds ($30 billion). “Let the Gulf 
regimes know that if they did not give this money to me, I would know how to get 
it,” he added.®" In April 1990, five US senators traveled to Iraq and ended up 
lionizing and pampering Saddam based on his victory over Iran.®® This only 
served to further prove to Saddam that the US did not want a confrontation with 
Iraq. Then in July 1990 Saddam accused the oil-producing countries, specifically 
Kuwait, of exceeding quotas set by OPEC in a deliberate attempt to keep the 
price of oil low. Iraq's economy had been devastated after the Iran-lraq War, so 
Saddam perceived this as an economic war against Iraq.®® The US, still trying to 
reach out to Iraq through appeasement, did not interpret the signals that Saddam 
was sending about his plans to invade Kuwait. On the 25*'* of July, there was a 
meeting between Saddam and the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. While 
Saddam angrily talked of being threatened by Kuwait, Glaspie did not explicitly 
tell him that the US would not sit by and watch him invade Kuwait. Saddam 
misread her cautious reply to him as a green light to invade Kuwait.®  ̂On August 
2,1990, he sent his forces into Kuwait, which resulted in the condemnation of the 
US and the entire international community against Iraq. Less than six months 
later, Iraq was facing the most impressive coalition of military firepower 
assembled since World War II.
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Once the war started, the US committed its military wholeheartedly to the 
attack against Iraq and brought a preponderance of military equipment and 
troops to the international coalition that had been formed. US aircraft flew as 
many as 3,000 to 4,000 sorties a day, using advanced aircraft such as the F-117 
stealth fighter and high-tech precision-guided munitions. Overall, the US sent 
75% of its active tactical aircraft, 42% of its tanks, 46% of its Marines, 37% of its 
army, and 46% of its aircraft carriers.®® The US deployed the most ground troops, 
250,000-300,000, with Saudi Arabia providing the second highest number of 
troops, 75,000.®®
After the victory, many believed the US did not go far enough to topple 
Saddam’s regime. The coalition leaders assumed that the combination of 
military defeat and internal unrest as a result of the war would be enough to end 
Saddam’s regime. In fact, for many years after the Gulf war, the US tried to 
foment a coup in Baghdad."® Sanctions and the US strikes on Iraqi forces in the 
no-fly zones were also intended to discredit Saddam’s regime and weaken his 
personal protection forces. But as discussed earlier, it is much more difficult to 
influence change in the Middle East due to its non-democratic nature.
The no-fly zone aircraft patrols were another example of the US strategy 
to use military force against Iraq. The no-fly zones were set up under UN 
Resolution 688 in April 1991, to restrict Iraqi military movement and protect the 
civilian population of Iraq, especially the Kurds in the north."* For the past ten 
years, the US has flown thousands of sorties using rotating US fighter and 
bomber units that deploy to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait to patrol the northern
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and southern no-fly zones in Iraq. Iraq has remained for the most part defiant of 
the no-fly zones, and US missiles and bombs routinely strike Iraqi air defenses.
In 1999, there were over 600 reported violations of the no-fly zones by Iraqi 
military forces."^ Patrolling the no-fly zones has entailed having a significant US 
military presence in the Gulf. For example, in 1999 alone, US and British forces 
flew more than 6,000 sorties, dropped more than 1,800 bombs, and hit more than 
450 targets in Iraq. The 200 airplanes, 19 warships, and 22,000 troops it took to 
accomplish this cost the US taxpayer $1 billion that year alone."®
Once again, using military force to implement policy is going to be affected 
by the regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem. Overall, the US is 
working against some significant systemic characteristics when the decision to 
drop bombs on a country is made. Obviously the decision to use military force 
will not be greeted with blanket approval by an anti-American, anti-imperialist 
region that still struggles to maintain a sense of pan-Arab unity. In the case of 
the Gulf War, where an Arab country invaded another sovereign Arab country, 
many in the region supported US military action. However, the continued US 
bombing of Iraq over the past decade has caused support for this strategy to 
wane among many Arab nations. The Arab-lsraeli imbroglio also negatively 
affects the US' ability to wage war in the region without negative repercussions. 
Unabashed US support of Israel makes most US actions in the region subject to 
intense scrutiny and reluctant public acceptance.
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Conclusion
The US has implemented many types of policy actions in the Middle East 
to achieve its policy goals. Some or all of the unique regional considerations that 
make up the Middle East subsystem have affected these strategies. In general 
there are some summary effects the region has had on US policy goals and 
strategies. First, the fact that the subsystem is fragmented (into conservative 
and radical regimes) has a positive effect on the implementation of US policy in 
the region. Fragmentation weakens the relative power of the system from US 
intrusions and unilateral policy decisions. This in turn decreases the second 
effect of the pan-Arab and pan-lslamic nature of the subsystem on US policy. A 
fragmented system is less prone to pursue pan-Arab goals that may deviate from 
US policy goals. Third, the anti-imperialist/anti-American nature of the 
subsystem has a harmful effect on US policy-making because of negative public 
opinion toward the US. This ties into a fourth consideration regarding the Arab- 
lsraeli imbroglio and its dominant effect on the subsystem. US support for Israel 
at the expense of the Palestinians also contributes to negative public opinion 
toward the US, thus making policy implementation more difficult. A fifth 
consideration is the economic structure of the region. The fact that small groups 
of Arab elite make the economic decisions for their nations can have a positive or 
negative effect on US policy-making. When it comes to securing oil or 
establishing close ties with cooperative regimes, this structure can be very 
helpful for the US. However, in terms of implementing sanctions, this can have a 
negative effect because the population is made to suffer, not the governing elite.
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Finally, the non-democratic nature of the regional subsystem generally has a 
positive effect on achieving US policy goals. This consideration allows US 
policy-makers to concentrate on winning over the governments in the region, not 
the general population, because of the limited amount of orderly participation in 
government. Once again though, implementing sanctions is actually harmed by 
this regional consideration since the effects of sanctions are less able to 
penetrate the general population and promote change in the government.
This thesis has attempted to establish that the Middle East operates as a 
regional subsystem, of which there are several regional considerations that can 
be taken into account regarding that subsystem. These systemic regional 
considerations will affect both the attainment of US policy goals and the 
implementation of strategies to reach those goals. Failure to recognize or 
adequately adapt to these regional considerations will probably lead to an 
unsuccessful policy outcome for the US. Chapter 5 examines the US strategy of 
sanctioning Iraq and look at the global, regional and domestic factors that affect 
this policy. The examination will show that the regional considerations of the 
Middle East and US policy structure are incompatible, thus contributing to failed 
policy strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
POST-GULF WAR POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
In the first four chapters of this thesis, the Middle East has been described 
as a regional subsystem, and the regional considerations that describe the 
subsystem have been outlined. I have examined US goals and strategy in the 
region, and looked at how the regional subsystem Impacts US policy. This final 
chapter will take a closer look at one policy in particular: US economic and 
military sanctions against Iraq since 1991. First, this chapter will show how US 
sanctions policy has failed to meet the majority of its objectives in Iraq. In 
addition to failing, the policy has also created additional problems of its own that 
will be discussed. Finally, it will be shown that sanctions are a failed policy 
because the policy did not take into account the regional considerations of the 
Middle East. A systemic assessment of sanctions will show how the Middle East 
subsystem has had significant impact on the outcome of this policy, and will 
continue to impact future US policies in the region.
Sanctioning Iraq
Economic sanctions have practically become the default option in US 
foreign policy since World War II.’ Sanctions have been an effective tool for
96
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change in some cases. For example, the case of apartheid in South Africa is one
such success story. The US and the rest of the international community began a
concerted effort to uphold United Nations (UN) sanctions against South Africa in
1986. Less than five years later. Nelson Mandela was released from prison and
the widely despised policy of apartheid was ended. South Africa's relatively
peaceful transition to democracy showed that if given enough time, sanctions can
work.^ However, the effectiveness cf sancticns is cften difficult to measure. It
requires a solid set of assessment criteria that answers the question: what is the
real purpose of the sanctions?®
Although a much more palatable option than military force, oftentimes
sanctions do prove to be ineffective. In some cases, they alter the target
country’s economy and internal politics in ways that make the country’s offensive
behavior even more difficult to reverse.'* The Secretary of the UN Sanctions
Committees wrote in 1995:
First, sanctions generally should not be employed as a permanent feature 
of policy against any targeted country because the damage they are likely 
to cause to the long-term infrastructure of that country may far exceed the 
extent of the wrong committed.®
For example, Saddam Hussein is still firmly in power and thumbs his nose at UN
weapons inspectors after 11 years of US sanctions. So despite a decade of
sanctions, Saddam’s “offensive behavior” continues. There has also been
negative backlash from other Arab countries over continued sanctions in Iraq,
which will be addressed below.
Sanctions are basically a punishment tool used by one country to control
the behavior of another. However, this tool rests on the assumption that the
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target country is an entity capable of rational behavior.® The question is, what 
happens when the target state is controlled by a leader who makes decisions 
that are arguably irrational in the eyes of those who impose such sanctions? 
Unfortunately for US policy-makers, the result appears to be that the best 
intentions of US policy toward Iraq get lost in the translation. But in addition to 
the effects of sanctions being skewed by Saddam Hussein, the regional 
considerations of the Middle East also affect US sanctions in Iraq. The 
subsystem effects on US sanctions policy will be discussed later in this chapter.
US Aims with Sanctioning Iraq 
To assess the US sanctions policy toward Iraq, one must start with the 
aims of that policy. Although they have evolved over the past 11 years, there 
have generally been four primary objectives.^ First, Iraq should be contained 
from further aggression against its neighbors (and to some extent its own 
population). Second, Iraq’s buildup of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
should be halted, destroyed and prevented in the future. Part of this objective 
has been to coerce Saddam Hussein into cooperating with the provisions in the 
UN Resolutions that dealt with WMD. Third, Saddam Hussein’s regime should 
be toppled. Initially after Desert Storm, there was some friction between US 
politicians and military commanders on whether the US should march to 
Baghdad and remove Saddam from power. A debate over this objective still 
lingers today as many Arab countries friendly to the US oppose removing 
Saddam and disrupting the balance of power in the region. And fourth, regional
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stability in the Middle East should be preserved and US interests protected.® The 
next five sections will describe how economic and military sanctions in Iraq have 
failed to achieve many of the objectives and have led to several negative 
repercussions for US policy goals.
Non-Compliance with UN Resolutions 
The second and fourth objectives (destroy WMD and preserve regional 
stability) are not being achieved due to Iraq’s continued non-compliance with UN 
Resolutions. UN Resolution 687, enacted at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf 
War, demanded that Iraq comply with four tasks: identify and destroy its WMD 
capabilities, respect Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty and border, repatriate any 
POWs, and pay war claims.® The first task has proven to be the most difficult for 
Iraq to comply with. In 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UN weapons 
inspectors. Iraq continues to defy most sections of Resolutions 687 and 1284 
(passed in 1999 to reinstate weapons inspectors) and remains committed to 
developing WMD and the capability to deliver them.’®
Prior to the dismissal of weapons inspectors in late 1998, evidence was 
mounting that Iraq, despite its claims to the contrary, did not destroy its WMD 
program. From the end of Desert Storm, Saddam was committed to neither 
declaring his WMD arsenal nor cooperating in its destruction.”  In 1995 the chief 
of Iraq’s WMD programs defected and revealed that Iraq had manufactured and 
loaded the lethal chemical agent VX on its weapons. It was only after this 
defection that it became clear Iraq had also amassed a formidable biological
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
weapons program, despite four years of intrusive inspections.’  ̂As these less- 
than-effective inspections dragged on, Saddam actually forced concessions out 
of the weapons inspectors by declaring several military sites as "presidential" 
sites and thus off-limits. He also gained the tacit support of France, China and 
Russia, which all became highly critical throughout the 1990s of both inspections 
and sanctions. Therefore, despite the limited progress the UN had in destroying 
elements of Iraq’s WMD arsenal early in the inspections process, there is 
evidence that Iraq continues to retain much of its arsenal today and is continuing 
to expand its WMD program.’® For Iraq, the loss of $25 billion in revenue (from 
sanctions since 1991} appears to be a lower priority than retaining its arsenal of 
chemical and biological weapons.’  ̂At least for the time being, it appears that 
Saddam Hussein believes he is better off not complying with the UN Resolutions.
Saddam Hussein is Still in Power 
The third and fourth objectives of US sanctions against Iraq (regime 
change and regional stability) are also not being achieved due to the fact that 
Saddam still maintains a firm grip on power and continually threatens US military 
forces in the region. Economic sanctions directed at Iraq have not translated into 
pressure against Saddam given the level of control he exerts over the population. 
Saddam rules his country through fear and intimidation and surrounds himself 
with loyal followers who are afraid to contradict him.’® In addition to retaining 
political control, sanctions have enabled Saddam to have more economic control 
over Iraq as well. Due to the devastating effects of sanctions, Saddam was
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forced to institute price controls to counteract hoarding and overcharging. He 
also changed monetary policy and banned the use of older Dinar notes outside of 
Iraq. This act claimed to be a fix for a counterfeiting problem, but in reality the 
majority of older Dinar note holders were his nemesis, the Kurds in the north. So 
this policy prevented the Kurds from trading across the border with neighboring 
countries. The government was now able to use this increased control to punish 
its enemies and potential sources of opposition to the regime.’® The devastation 
from sanctions has also forced the Iraqi population to become more economically 
dependent on the government. This has inadvertently added to a sense of 
nationalism. One Iraqi told USA Today in 2000, “Any doubts I had about 
Saddam are gone...Now I want him to stand up to the US for taking away my 
power, my running water, and my daughter's childhood.”’  ̂Instead of weakening 
Saddam’s grip on Iraqi society, sanctions have actually forced him to re- 
centralize control over the economy and tighten his hold on Iraq.
Given this assessment of Saddam’s grip on power, it would seem 
unrealistic to hope that sanctions would help to topple his regime. However, this 
is exactly what many officials in the US government have been hoping for—that 
sanctioning Iraq will force opposition forces in the country to rise up against 
Saddam. President Clinton, in a statement presented to the House of 
Representatives in May 1999, stated:
We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he 
will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region and 
the security of the world. We will continue to contain these threats, but over the 
long term the best way to address them is through a new government in 
Baghdad. To that end, working with the Congress, we have deepened our
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engagement with the forces of change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more 
effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people.’®
As mentioned in Chapter 3, President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union
address reiterated his desire to see a regime change in Iraq.’® The Iraqi
government knows that the US favors keeping sanctions in place until there is a
regime change; thus there's no incentive for Saddam to work with the US or
intrusive inspectors.^ Publicly tying sanctions to toppling Saddam has given him
little reason to cooperate, thus highlighting the futility of designing sanctions to
attack a country's fundamental identity or mission, which in this case is wrapped
up in Saddam Hussein himself.^’
Humanitarian Concerns
There are also some negative repercussions for the US from its sanctions
policy toward Iraq. One is the increasing humanitarian concerns for the Iraqi
population. The plight of the Iraqi population suffering under the strain of
economic sanctions has often been cited as reason enough to stop sanctioning
Iraq. There are some estimates that as many as 500,000 Iraqi children have
died since 1991 as a result of sanctions.^ The former UN humanitarian
coordinator for Iraq observed recently:
In addition to the scarcity of resources, malnutrition problems also seem to 
stem from the massive deterioration in basic infrastructure, in particular in 
the water-supply and waste disposal systems. The most vulnerable 
groups have been the hardest hit, especially children under five years of 
age who are being exposed to unhygienic conditions, particularly in urban 
centers. The [World Food Program] estimates that access to potable 
water is currently 50 percent of the 1990 level in urban areas and only 33 
percent in rural areas.“
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Iraq’s health care system, once the most efficient and effective in the Middle 
East, is now in shambles due to sanctions. Iraq's educational system declined 
under sanctions and has been decimated by overcrowded classrooms, the lack 
of school supplies, the lack of medical supplies, no heating or cooling systems, 
and the lack of a professional teacher base.“
The humanitarian concerns that sanctions have produced are eroding 
international and Arab support for US policies in the region. In response, the US 
in 2002 cooperated with a UN Security Council resolution that allows the free 
flow of humanitarian goods into Iraq without oversight of the UN. However, the 
UN must still review a lengthy list of goods such as telecommunications and 
information technology equipment. This newest resolution may ease some of the 
humanitarian concerns related to sanctions, but it is unlikely to stop countries 
such as France and Russia from pushing for a complete end to sanctions in Iraq.
The humanitarian crisis caused by sanctions has provided Saddam 
Hussein a cause to rally his people around and a “Great Satan " to blame for his 
people's suffering. Although lifting sanctions does not guarantee that Saddam 
will improve the social conditions of Iraq's population, there is evidence that he 
might. For example, before and after the Iran-lraq War, Iraq's government 
worked at investing more resources to raise the standard of living for the average 
Iraqi citizen (thus ensuring loyalty to the regime).“  Public spending rose from 
$21 billion in 1980 to $29.5 billion in 1982. The majority of this budget increase 
was spent on civilian imports to prevent commodity shortages during the Iran- 
lraq War.“  Saddam started various construction projects as he tried to convert
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Baghdad from a medieval to a modern city. He could very well choose the same 
path again if sanctions are lifted.
Heavy Toll on US Military 
Another negative repercussion of sanctions is the heavy toll this policy 
takes on US military forces. Military sanctions, in the form of two no-fly zones 
over northern and southern Iraq, were instituted under UN Resolution 688 in April 
1991 to restrict Iraqi movements and protect the civilian populations in the north 
(Kurds) and south (Shi’as).“  With the exception of some help from British forces, 
the US military has shouldered the majority of the burden of maintaining these 
no-fly zones for the past 11 years. The US has flown thousands of sorties using 
rotating US fighter and bomber aircraft units to patrol the northern and southern 
no-fly zones. In 1999 alone, US and UK forces had flown more than 6,000 
sorties, dropped more than 1,800 bombs and hit more than 450 targets in Iraq. 
The 200 airplanes, 19 warships, and 22,000 troops it took to accomplish this cost 
the US taxpayer $1 billion that year.“  Since the end of the Gulf War, the US has 
spent over $8 billion containing Iraq (as of 2000). In addition to the monetary 
cost, patrolling the no-fly zones provides a tremendous amount of wear and tear 
on US military forces, especially US Air Force and US Navy aircraft.^ The 
continual operations and the regular surges required to deploy to the region have 
challenged military rotation and leave schedules. The inhospitable welcome 
often given to Western forces further strains the military. Morale, retention, and 
overall readiness have fallen as a result.®®
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In recent years, the frequency of Iraqi violations in these no-fly zones has 
increased as Saddam continues to test the resolve of US military units and whip 
up Arab support for his cause. In 1999, there were over 600 reported violations 
of the no-fly zones by Iraqi military forces.®’ Saddam has invoked military 
reactions from the US on numerous occasions in the past decade, including 
major confrontations during January 1993, Operation Desert Strike in September 
1996, Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, and countless tit-for-tat strikes 
since 1999.®̂
The high cost of military sanctions and Iraq's recalcitrant behavior in
complying with UN Resolutions has caused many US government leaders to ask
if the money spent containing Iraq has been worth the effort. The Chairman of
the US House Committee for International Relations stated in 2000;
Since (Operation Desert Fox in 1998), Saddam has routinely challenged 
our aircraft patrolling over the no-fly zones, and we have retaliated each 
time with air strikes. Again, we are told this policy is a success because it 
is degrading Saddam's capabilities. Maybe we are degrading his 
capabilities, but he does not seem to mind too much, because he keeps 
provoking us to degrade him some more...®®
Another member of the House Committee may have summed it up best when he
drew a comparison between Saddam Hussein's life expectancy and that of his
colleague from South Carolina, Senator Strom Thurmond. “If Saddam had
anywhere near the same kind of life expectancy (98), you could be looking at
say. . .about $48 billion in direct cost to continue to maintain these military
sanctions. Do you think this approximately $50 billion expenditure is
worthwhile?”®̂ The increasing frustration over the high cost of enforcing
sanctions and Iraq's continued defiance of UN Resolutions has prompted US
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policy-makers to look for a more permanent solution in Iraq. Hence, there is 
increased discussion in the US news media in 2002 (especially after the 
September 11^ terrorist attacks) about finally ousting Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq through military force, if necessary. The underlying message from 
this discussion is that sanctions have failed to achieve US objectives in Iraq.
Loss of International Support for Sanctions 
And finally, sanctioning Iraq has resulted in a loss of regional and 
international support for US policy, thus making successful policy-making in the 
region more difficult. The US finds itself increasingly isolated from even the 
conservative countries in the Middle East over its sanctions policy in Iraq. For 
example, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey have grown less 
supportive of military strikes on Iraq in recent years. The Saudis have dictated 
what types of missions can be flown from their air bases, and Turkey has also 
occasionally refused the US permission to conduct strikes from its air bases.®® 
Additionally, in Saudi Arabia both mainstream and radical dissident groups 
have been protesting the large US military presence in the Kingdom. Saudis are 
particularly upset about the cost of maintaining the US presence, arguing the 
money could be better spent on services and infrastructure. Many Saudis in the 
business community oppose the US presence because of the decline in 
government hand-outs to the business sector, in order to pay for the US military 
presence.®® The US military presence has also fueled the fire of Muslim extremist 
groups such as AI Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden. One of the key principles of
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Al Qaeda is to unite all Muslims, to overthrow all Muslim governments which are 
viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from those countries, and 
eventually to abolish state boundaries. They advocate the use of force to 
confront all foreign forces stationed on Islamic land.®  ̂Removal of the US 
presence in Saudi Arabia is clearly a number one priority for these Muslim 
extremist groups. In addition to the trouble caused by a large US military 
presence, other nations are also concerned with the US objective of toppling 
Saddam’s regime. Saudi Arabia and others are concerned that any opposition 
success might increase the Shi'a influence in Iraq and further destabilize the 
region. (Saudi Arabia is primarily Sunni Muslim, as is Saddam’s government.)
In general, the policy of retaining economic and military sanctions on Iraq 
for the past decade has caused a large split among the UN Security Council 
members. France, China and Russia have increasingly criticized the economic 
sanctions and on-going bombings of Iraq. As permanent members of the 
Security Council, they challenge the US and UK positions to retain sanctions.®® 
Another open split between the UN Security Council members comes from 
France and Russia, who have been openly trying to broker a deal between 
Baghdad and the Kurdish parties in Iraq, something the US has not supported. 
The US has tried to stay out of Kurdish internal affairs, and only supports the 
Kurds through its policy of providing humanitarian assistance and protection 
through the northern no-fly zone.®®
Proponents of sanctions toward Iraq have argued that Iraq has not 
attacked its neighbors; therefore sanctions have been an effective policy tool.̂ ®
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While this argument does satisfy the first of the four objectives mentioned above, 
it does so at an enormous cost, and the other three objectives are left unfulfilled.
It is important to try to understand why this policy has not worked in Iraq, and 
look at the global, domestic, and especially regional explanations for the policy's 
failure. Now that sanctions have been described as a failed policy, it is important 
to show that sanctions have been incompatible with the regional considerations 
of the Middle East subsystem since the implementation of that policy.
Incompatibility with the Middle East Subsystem 
Sanctions are an incompatible policy choice in the Middle East at all three 
levels of analysis to some degree: globally, regionally, and domestically.
Globally, the diminishing international support of US policy toward Iraq since the 
end of the Gulf War has politically hindered US ability to promote regional 
stability and protect intrinsic interests (as discussed in Chapter 3). The US is 
seen as an imperial enemy by the majority of Muslims, particularly Arab 
nationalists and Islamic populists, due to its role in the Gulf War, sanctions, and 
its support of Israel.'”  The US has proven that it can protect its interests (such as 
access to oil and the protection of Israel) through overwhelming military force. 
However, it has become increasingly difficult for the US to keep a “coalition” of 
states together to support its policies such as sanctioning Iraq.^^ Therefore, the 
increased global difficulty for unilateral US actions has contributed to the failure 
of sanctions in Iraq to a degree.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it has become apparent that the only 
reliable US partners in the Middle East are Britain and Israel. As mentioned 
above, Russia, France and China have taken a softer stance toward Iraq when it 
comes to sanctions. US policy decisions have diverged from even traditional 
coalition partners such as Japan or Western Europe as well. There are very real 
differences among Europe, Japan and the US in terms of national strategic 
interests, diplomatic priorities, investment and trade interests, and domestic 
political and economic interests. Japan and Europe have emphasized trade, 
arms sales, and critical dialogue at a time when the US emphasizes strategic 
stability, power projection, and counter-proliferation. Also, US ties to Israel are 
much stronger than those of Japan and any European state.̂ ® The US 
emphasizes sanctions and "dual containment," and labels Iraq (and Iran) as 
rogue states. Britain still supports US policy choices in the region, but the US 
receives less support from other European countries (most notably France). 
Japan does not usually differ from the US on policy towards Iraq publicly, but 
privately has growing reservations that US policy towards Iraq lacks a realistic 
resolution and may interfere with Japanese economic investment.^
The loss of global support for sanctions in Iraq is indicative of the loss of 
support for US policies in the region in general. If US policy were more in 
concert with the regional considerations of the Middle East, it seems more likely 
that US policies would draw more support from the global community. However, 
the sanctions policy against Iraq, for example, is a policy that is structurally 
flawed at the regional and domestic level as well as the international level.
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Before we examine the regional-level problems with US sanctions policy, it is 
important to review the incompatibility of the policy at the domestic level as well.
US support for Israel, combined with US domestic politics, makes it 
difficult to come up with a better policy than sanctions against Iraq to achieve US 
objectives. The US bias towards Israel (see Chapter 3) prevents a balanced 
approach in the region. This is especially evident in the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio 
where US domestic politics have precluded an even-handed approach to 
negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.̂ ® The strong inclination to reinforce 
Israel at all costs remains the largest obstacle to a balanced foreign policy 
approach in the Middle East. As a result of the current US political agenda, 
which includes not only support for Israel but also a call for the containment of 
rogue regimes, there has been little domestic pressure to lift sanctions against 
Iraq. Instead, the demonizing of Saddam Hussein and Iraq (by US politicians 
and media) has permitted the sanctions policy to be continued, despite the 
numerous problems mentioned above that this policy has caused for the US at 
the global and regional levels. Unfortunately, US policy-makers do not usually 
analyze Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Arab-lsraeli problem systematically. It is 
unclear whether the US population or policy-makers fully understand the 
ramifications of sanctioning Iraq and wanting to support Israel at the same time. 
This lack of regional analysis prevents the search for more viable solutions to US 
policy concerns that would be more compatible with the regional considerations 
of the Middle East.
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Besides the incompatibility of continued sanctions against Iraq at the 
global and domestic levels, the policy is largely inconsistent with the regional 
considerations outlined in Chapter 2. First, the non-democratic nature of the 
region, especially Iraq, skews the effect sanctions will have on a country. Johan 
Galtung concluded that sanctioning regimes that restrict all aspects of society 
creates a more significant “rally-around-the-flag" effect than sanctioning 
democratic societies.'*® Since Saddam Hussein controls the government and the 
economy of Iraq, he has significant control over whether the average Iraqi citizen 
will feel the effects of sanctions or not (and whom they will blame). In the Iraqi 
case, the population is suffering under sanctions, yet Saddam controls the 
country with an iron fist so that there can be no dissent as a result of sanctions.
Another way US sanctions policy is not compatible with the Middle East 
regional subsystem comes from the economic structure of the region. The region 
(and Iraq in particular) is much less developed than the West; therefore the 
effects of sanctions will not be as harmful to the Iraqi economy as they would be 
to a Western, industrialized country. The Iraqi economy at the beginning of 
sanctions was not dependent on imports, which complicated the effects of 
sanctions policy. There was sufficient domestic production to meet the minimum 
needs of the population. Also, because of Iraq's experience during the Iran-lraq 
War, Iraqi procurement procedures already included buying spare parts and 
coping with patchwork repairs.'*^
A third way US sanctions policy is not compatible with the regional 
considerations of the Middle East is the US' role in the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio.
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Israel’s actions against the Palestinians in the occupied territories are inexorably 
linked to the US due to the tremendous amount of US aid provided to Israel. As 
mentioned throughout this thesis, US support for Israel precludes any 
widespread support of sanctions on Iraq by other Arab nations. As an example, 
at the most recent Arab League Summit (March 2002), two important resolutions 
were agreed upon. First, that there should be peace between the Arabs and 
Israelis and that Israel should withdraw its forces back to the 1967 borders. A 
second resolution proclaimed unanimous opposition (including Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia) to any further US-led attack on Iraq and "the lifting of the sanctions on 
Iraq, ending the punishment of the Iraqi people."^® The resolutions indicate a 
softer approach taken toward Iraq, which is perceived to be much less a threat to 
the Arab states now than the escalation of violence between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. At the Organization of the Islamic Conference (QIC) summit in 
Malaysia (April 2002), the Muslim nations declared they would maintain a “united 
front" upholding the struggles of people under colonial domination for national 
liberation. The QIC also declared; “We reject any unilateral action taken against 
any Islamic country under the pretext of combating international terrorism, as this 
will undermine global cooperation against terrorism."^® These summit resolutions 
show growing solidarity of Arab and Muslim nations against unilateral US policy 
decisions.
A fourth area that shows US sanctions policy incompatibility with the 
Middle East subsystem is that it runs contrary to the pan-Arab ideals that are 
espoused in the region. As mentioned above, the most recent Arab League
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summit resolutions underscore the idea that pan-Arab ideals are making a 
comeback in the 2000s. Saudi Arabia’s peace proposal for the Arab-lsraeli 
imbroglio was the first-ever Arab peace initiative offered to resolve the conflict. 
Although too early to tell, this peace initiative could be indicative of a new 
movement among the Arab population in the Middle East to reenergize pan-Arab 
goals. Either way, the pan-Arabism that has defined the Middle East subsystem 
is not compatible with the US policy of “punishing” Iraq through economic and 
military sanctions.
If pan-Arabism continues to rise and the subsystem becomes more 
focused, the US may find it increasingly difficult to enact policy decisions and 
protect its strategic interests in the region. The potential for reversing the rising 
trend of unity among Arabs and Muslims exists, but lately it has become more 
difficult. Pan-Arabism feeds off the issues of Islamism. Therefore pan-Arabism 
is more likely to follow the rise and fall of Islamic fundamentalism. The US war 
on terrorism has angered many radical fundamentalists in the Middle East, who 
see this war as being waged against Islam in general (refer to the poll data in 
Chapter 2 that showed a majority of Muslims condemn the US attack on 
Afghanistan). The renewed violence between Palestinians and Israelis has also 
served to bring this focal issue back to the minds of the Arab and Muslim 
population. Unfortunately, many Arabs believe the US has provided preferential 
treatment to Israel for decades. Thus it will take a major shift in US policy to 
prove the US can make a balanced approach in the region.
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Finally, in addition to the potential rise in pan-Arabism, the rise in anti- 
Americanism throughout the region highlights the incompatibility between 
sanctioning Iraq and regional considerations of the Middle East. The anti-US 
nature of the subsystem implies that most Middle Eastern nations will be 
reluctant to support US policies in general. And specifically, the harmful effect of 
sanctions on Iraq's population has increased that reluctance to support US 
policies. Many in the region and abroad assume that the West (especially the 
US) utilizes military force and sanctions for mostly economic motives and has no 
real concern for the general population in the Middle East. This assumption 
translates into a political cost of an increasingly negative public image among the 
Arab nationalist and populist communities. This public image is what lays the 
foundation for a secure future in which the US will be able to protect its own 
interests while helping to maintain regional security.®® The anti-Americanism that 
is prevalent in the Middle East subsystem, and the harmful effects of sanctions 
on the Iraqi population make sanctions an incompatible policy choice for the US 
to use in this region.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that sanctions in Iraq have failed to achieve the 
objectives they were designed to achieve (or kept in place to achieve). Saddam 
Hussein continues his WMD program, is not in compliance with UN Resolutions, 
and remains firmly in control of the country. Sanctions have not only been 
unable to achieve US objectives in Iraq, but there have been some serious costs
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partially attributable to this policy. Increasing humanitarian concerns in Iraq, the 
heavy toll on the US military, and the loss of international support for US policies 
in the region may all be related in part to sanctions in Iraq.
This assessment has shown that sanctions are incompatible with the 
regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem. Examining US sanctions 
toward Iraq in terms of the regional considerations showed how the policy was 
incompatible with five out of the six generalizations about the region. It is not 
surprising then that sanctions in Iraq have not been able to achieve US 
objectives for the past 11 years. Due to the nature of the region, sanctioning Iraq 
may not have been the best policy solution for the US in light of the failure to 
reach its objectives in this case. This appears to be the view of many within the 
US government and the general population as there is a renewed call to topple 
Saddam Hussein since the September 11th terrorist attacks. President Bush 
said in April 2002, "...the policy of my government is to remove Saddam and...all 
options are on the table.”®’ US public opinion polls have also found that over 75% 
of those polled favor having US forces take military action against Iraq to force 
Saddam Hussein from power.®  ̂This recent impetus to permanently “solve" the 
Saddam Hussein problem demonstrates the failure of US sanctions policy. The 
policy was incompatible with the regional considerations of the Middle East, and 
thus was doomed to fail from the beginning.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has established that the Middle East comprises a regional 
subsystem and, as such, actions that occur in one part of the region will affect 
the rest of the region. The subsystem is also characterized by a number of 
unique regional considerations that generally describe the behavior of countries 
in the Middle East. By analyzing these considerations, one can examine US 
policy in the region and begin to measure the policy's success based on those 
considerations. A policy designed to complement the pan-Arabism or non- 
democratic manner of the region, for example, is a policy that has a greater 
chance of success. A policy that opposes these considerations is more likely to 
fail.
Policy-makers tend to overlook the fact that the region must be analyzed 
as a whole when anticipating responses to US policies. For example, any policy 
designed to mitigate the fighting between Palestinians and Israelis must take into 
account the reactions throughout the Middle East. Due to the nature of the 
region, and the US' prominent role in the region, policies with one country will 
have spillover effects into other countries. The way the US designs a 
Palestinian-lsraeli policy is affected by its previous and future policies made 
toward Iraq, Iran, or Saudi Arabia for example. Once the Middle East is
120
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interpreted as a system, it is easier to understand why some policies are more 
likely to fail than others.
Analyzing the Middle East in a systemic manner is not only important to 
ensure successful policy outcomes, but because the failure of US policy 
damages future credibility. There has been a strong tendency in the US to make 
foreign policy decisions based on public opinion, strong lobbying tactics, or 
ideological reasons, without looking at the wider issues in the Middle East.
These domestic constraints on US policy-makers have resulted in policies that 
appear to be inconsistent to many both regionally and globally. This type of ad- 
hoc policy-making without a long-term plan and solid regional analysis has 
damaged the credibility of the US in the region.^
From a US foreign policy perspective, there are two major issues in 2002 
facing the US in the Middle East: the increased violence between Israel and the 
Palestinians, and what to do with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Based on 
systemic analysis of the region as outlined in this thesis, the Arab-lsraeli issue 
should be a top priority for the US. This conflict tends to polarize the region, 
invigorate the radical regimes and Islamic extremists, and could become the 
dominant issue for Arabs in the Middle East. The US must be careful in its 
policy-making pertinent to this conflict because of the anti-US and pan-Arab/pan- 
Islamic nature of the region, coupled with the perception of a bias toward Israel 
and historically inconsistent policy-making. A balanced approach in bringing an 
end to the violence between the Arabs and Israelis would be the first step in 
finding a policy solution compatible with the Middle East subsystem. However,
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based on the current perception of the US as the defender of Israel over the 
Palestinians, and given the state of US domestic politics, a balanced approach is 
not very likely in the near future.
The other major issue facing US politicians in the short term is how to get 
rid of Saddam Hussein. The impetus behind finally ousting Saddam, according 
to US policy-makers, is that Saddam still poses a risk to the region (and 
potentially the world) with his weapons of mass destruction. He has also loosely 
been linked to supporting terrorist organizations, and the US has vowed to wipe 
out terrorism and those who support terrorists. The most popular policy solution 
to eliminate the perceived threat Saddam poses is to topple his regime in Iraq. 
This policy has a number of regional systemic problems. First, there is virtually 
no support from the conservative Arab states to oust Saddam. An attack on Iraq 
would likely strain relations between the US and its conservative Arab partners to 
the breaking point. Second, it would fuel the anti-Americanism that is on the rise 
throughout the general population of the Middle East and possibly provide a 
focusing event to rally the Arab population. Third, it could threaten the stability of 
oil exports and prices, as well as threaten regional stability depending on the 
nature of a new Iraqi government. Additionally, there is virtually no international 
support for ousting Saddam, with the exception of Great Britain. As discussed 
earlier in Chapter 3, it has become exceedingly difficult for the US to act 
unilaterally in the post-Gold War environment, making an attack on Iraq a very 
difficult policy to uphold.
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The Middle East in 2002 is faced with multiple problems that threaten US 
interests in the region: the alienation of the ruling elites from population, the 
resurgence of Islamic movements, and increased violence between the Arabs 
and Israel. US policy-makers need to understand all of these issues from a 
systemic and regional perspective and make choices that are compatible with the 
regional considerations of the Middle East. US policy support for Israel 
especially needs to be reevaluated in terms of whether it is a “national interest” or 
a “special interest.” The widespread negative effect this one policy has on many 
US policies throughout the Arab world underscores the importance of taking a 
closer look at the emphasis the US has placed on supporting Israel. US policy­
makers need to understand that whether the policy is sanctioning Iraq, stationing 
troops in Saudi Arabia, providing aid to Israel, or ferreting out terrorists in Yemen, 
every policy action by the US is absorbed and reacted to by the Middle East as a 
subsystem. What is needed is a sophisticated, systemic analysis of the Middle 
East by US policy-makers to ensure US policies are successful.
Systems Theory as an Analytical Tool 
Finally, it is important to examine how valuable the systemic approach has 
been as a policy analysis tool. The application of systems theory has been 
somewhat out of vogue since the 1970s in the field of international relations. 
Tareq Ismael’s 1986 book. International Relations of the Contemoorarv Middle 
East, used the systems approach to describe the Middle East and current issues 
in the region. However, systems theory was not used as a tool to analyze
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particular foreign policies in Ismael’s book. As a tool for examining the issues of 
a particular region, and the policies made internal and external to that region, the 
systems approach has its merits. It allows one to use cultural, historical, 
economic, and ideological as well as political attributes in combination when 
describing the region. This is a broader, more complete approach than many 
traditional theoretical international relations approaches that focus on one aspect 
at a time such as economics or national security.
However, the systems approach does have some weaknesses. Most 
significantly, its ability to encompass so many attributes of a region is a 
hindrance as well as an advantage. Although a more thorough approach than 
concentrating on one variable, there is virtually an infinite amount of inputs and 
outputs to a system, making it impossible to account for all of the variables. The 
six regional considerations used in this thesis were selected because they 
appear to be the most salient features of the Middle East regional subsystem. 
They also have the most significant affect on US policy-making. However, there 
may be other regional characteristics that also describe the Middle East 
accurately.
Despite Kaplan’s use of the word “rules” in his models of international 
systems, there can never truly be any rules about how a system operates 
(Kaplan does concede however that his rules merely specify “characteristic 
behaviors” of systems).^ The variables of a system are too numerous to account 
for everything that affects a system of states. Additionally, every state in a 
system will not always act in accordance with the characteristics of that system.
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Therefore the systems approach is only useful in making broad generalities 
about a regional or global system.
The approach taken in this thesis has been an attempt to use theoretical 
aspects of the systems approach and operationalize the concepts to make a 
useful tool. In this respect, systems theory provided the framework to analyze 
current US policy toward the Middle East and its failure in the case of Iraqi 
sanctions. As Harold Saunders wrote, “...familiar concepts of international 
relations do not always explain what we see in an area such as the Middle East, 
and familiar instruments of statecraft do not reliably produce the results we 
expect of them.”  ̂Because of this, using a somewhat unique approach to conduct 
policy analysis (systems theory) has provided a unique perspective on US 
policies in the Middle East. This perspective could be useful to policy-makers 
and aid them in formulating sound policies compatible with the region. This in 
turn would increase the chance of policy success and the attainment of US goals 
in the Middle East.
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Conclusion Notes
^Tareq Y. Ismael, Intemational Relations and the Contemporary Middle 
East: A Study in World Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986),
161.
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Intemational Politics (New 
York: Wiley, 1957), 9.
^Harold H. Saunders, “A Broader Peace Process for the Middle East," in 
The Middie East in Global Perspective, eds. Judith Kipper and Harold H. 
Saunders (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 301.
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